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Why the President Should Remain Commander in
Chief of the D.C. National Guard
Christopher F. Melling
Following the “Save America” rally on January 6, protestors
breached the Capitol and prevented Congress from certifying the
2020 presidential election. The riot led to President Trump’s
impeachment and proposed legislation that would give the
District of Columbia mayor control over the D.C. National
Guard. Representatives also renewed calls for D.C. statehood,
which would lead to its governor commanding the Guard. Yet the
Constitution, statutes, and historical practice assert that that the
President—not Congress or the D.C. executive—should
command D.C.’s National Guard. Certainly, revoking or limiting
the President’s power over the Guard would prove satisfying in
the short term, but it would disrupt the District’s political
balance. Regardless of the parade of horribles that January 6
inspires, the President should remain the commander of the D.C.
National Guard. Additionally, there are two significant
safeguards preventing another January 6: military officials can
leverage their expansive delegated power and cleave to their oaths
of office.
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INTRODUCTION
America experienced a tragedy on January 6, 2021.1 On that
day, as Congress met to certify the 2020 presidential election,
President Trump proclaimed from the Ellipse,2 “We will never give
up . . . . You don’t concede when there’s theft involved. . . . And if
you don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to have a country
anymore.”3 He was talking about the results of the 2020 election,
which Trump claimed were in doubt two weeks before
Inauguration Day.4 The crowd reacted favorably to the President’s
1. In President Joe Biden’s words, it was “the worst attack on our democracy since
the Civil War.” Full Transcript: President Joe Biden Delivers Speech to Joint Session of Congress,
ABC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2021, 8:26 PM), https://abcn.ws/2QLMm7Y [hereinafter Biden].
2. Located just south of the White House, the Ellipse is a fifty-two-acre grass area
used for public events. See Ellipse, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Ellipse
(last visited Oct. 7, 2021). For an in-depth look at the Ellipse’s unique features and history,
see Clark Kimberling, The Shape and History of the Ellipse in Washington, D.C. (Dep’t of
Mathematics, Univ. of Evansville), https://faculty.evansville.edu/ck6/ellipse.pdf (last
visited Aug. 19, 2021).
3. Transcript of Trump’s Speech at Rally Before U.S. Capitol Riot, AP NEWS (Jan. 13, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-capitol-siege-mediae79eb5164613d6718e9f4502eb471f27 [hereinafter Trump]; Bloomberg Quicktake: Now, LIVE:
Trump Delivers Remarks at the “Save America Rally” in Washington, D.C., YOUTUBE (Jan. 6, 2021),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ht20eDYmLXU (Trump’s remarks begin at 2:34:38.).
4. See, e.g., William Cummings, Joey Garrison & Jim Sergent, By the Numbers: President
Donald Trump’s Failed Efforts to Overturn the Election, USA TODAY (Jan. 6, 2021, 8:50 AM),
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message and thousands took Trump’s call to march on the Capitol
literally.5 Within the hour, a crowd had indeed marched to the
Capitol ostensibly to prevent Congress from certifying electoral
results.6 And they succeeded. Rioters forcibly gained entrance to
the Capitol and Congress evacuated the chambers where they were
certifying the results.7 Over the next few hours, the President
remained largely silent despite the Capitol Police’s urgent calls for
National Guard reinforcements.8 The acting Secretary of Defense
eventually mobilized the District of Columbia National Guard
(DCNG), but it took hours to restore order at the Capitol.9
Because of the President’s admonition to march to the Capitol
and his subsequent failure to deploy the DCNG when requested,
some have suggested changes to the DCNG’s command structure.
Specifically, some have demanded that the mayor of D.C., or
should D.C. become a state,10 the governor, control the Guard.
https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/01/06/trumps-failedefforts-overturn-election-numbers/4130307001/.
5. The crowd at the rally offered several spontaneous shouts, like “Fight for Trump,”
“We love Trump,” and “We love you.” Trump, supra note 3.
6. Some in the crowd aimed to prevent Congress from certifying the electoral results.
See Dan Barry, Mike McIntire & Matthew Rosenberg, “Our President Wants Us Here”: The Mob
that
Stormed
the
Capitol,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
13,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/us/capitol-rioters.html (“[T]hose of you that don’t
have the moral fiber in your body, get some tonight . . . [b]ecause tomorrow, we the people
are going to be here and we want you to know we will not stand for a lie.” (quoting Michael
Flynn, former Trump National Security Advisor)).
7. Shelly Tan, Youjin Shin & Danielle Rindler, How One of America’s Ugliest Days Unraveled
Inside and Outside the Capitol, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
nation/interactive/2021/capitol-insurrection-visual-timeline/.
8. Elizabeth Goitein & Joseph Nunn, Why DC’s Mayor Should Have Authority over the
DC National Guard, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/analysis-opinion/why-dcs-mayor-should-have-authority-over-dc-national-guard
(“President Trump remained silent, other than a quick video message in which a request to
‘go home’ was sandwiched between claims that the election had been ‘stolen’ and warm
praise of the insurrectionists.”); see Claudia Grisales, Capitol Police Chief: Records Prove
Immediate Calls for Military Backup on Jan. 6, NPR (Feb. 25, 2021, 3:39 PM), https://n.pr/3z4qF4a.
9. See Laurel Wamsley, What We Know So Far: A Timeline of Security Response at the
Capitol on Jan. 6, NPR (Jan. 15, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://n.pr/3aLxJYD; Tan, supra note 7.
10. The House of Representatives passed the D.C. Statehood bill on April 22, 2021.
Washington, D.C. Admission Act, H.R. 51, 117th Cong. (2021), https://bit.ly/3AxZpel (last
visited Oct. 7, 2021). The bill now sits in the Senate with forty-four co-sponsors. Washington,
D.C. Admission Act, S. 51, 117th Cong. (2021), https://bit.ly/2YHPEgf (last visited Oct. 7,
2021). But see Laura Olson, U.S. House Passes D.C. Statehood Bill, but Votes Still Lacking in Senate,
NBC12 (Apr. 25, 2021, 4:14 PM), https://www.nbc12.com/2021/04/25/us-house-passes-dcstatehood-bill-votes-still-lacking-senate/ (“[I]f the narrowly Democratic-controlled Senate
were to speedily bring up the measure, it would be all but guaranteed to fail.”).
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This Note, however, argues that the Constitution, federal and D.C.
statutes, and political realities confirm that the President should
control the DCNG. Shifting command to a local executive would
offend the Constitution and disrupt the political status quo.
Further, Presidents’ expansive delegation to the military and the
military’s oath of office adequately temper the risk of another
January 6.
The Note first reviews the events surrounding the Capitol riot,
explains why January 6 was an insurrection, describes the call for
changes to the DCNG’s command structure, and surveys D.C.’s
unique status and the DCNG. Part II contrasts the President and
Congress’s authority over the DCNG via the Constitution,
legislation, and statutes. Then, after describing how the shared
power model between the Executive and Legislative branches
relates to the military, Part III analyzes how the Constitution and
politics counsel against D.C.’s mayor or governor commanding the
DCNG. Part IV explains why the President should remain the
DCNG’s sole commander because of the Constitution and the
importance of preserving the status quo. Finally, the Note shows
how presidential delegation to subordinate military officers and
those officers’ oaths of office protect against presidential overreach.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The January 6 Capitol Riot
Post-election, President Trump claimed that the election results
were fraudulent and should be rejected by Americans and
certifying officials.11 Most of those statements appeared on Twitter
as early as November 13, 2020.12 Damningly, on January 2, the
11. Impeaching Donald John Trump, President of the United States, for high crimes
and misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 24, 117th Cong. (2021).
12. E.g., Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 13, 2020, 10:59:29 AM),
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22For+years+the+Dems%22
(“Now
[the Dems] are saying what a wonderful job the Trump Administration did in making 2020
the most secure election ever. Actually this is true, except for what the Democrats did. Rigged
Election”); Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 13, 2020, 7:32:26 PM),
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22these+states+in+question+should%2
2 (“These states in question should immediately be put in the Trump Win column. Biden did
not win, he lost by a lot!”); Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 25, 2020,
10:44:26 AM), https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22but+2020+is+a+long%22
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President asked the Georgia Secretary of State to find votes to
reverse the Georgia election results.13 Trump also invited his
supporters to the “Save America” rally on January 6 in D.C.14
Due to the widespread anger over the election, the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) produced a general threat assessment
that pointed to an increased threat of individuals prone to commit
violent acts.15 Two days before the riot, the D.C. Metropolitan Police
Department (MPD) arrested the Proud Boys’ leader, charging him
with property destruction and possession of illegal ammunition.16
The arrest was significant because of the alleged link between
President Trump and white supremacist groups.17 According to
their founder, the Proud Boys were formed in 2016 as a western
fraternity that promoted male bonding and socializing.18 However,
the Proud Boys had been prominent in the far-right movement
including their presence at demonstrations like the deadly “Unite
the Right” rally in Charlottesville and various Trump rallies.19
Given intelligence of the pending “Save America” rally, the Capitol
Police chief urged the Capitol Police Board and Congress to request
(“But 2020 is a long way from over!”); Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec.
26, 2020, 8:51:55 AM), https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22election+fraud%22
(“The U.S. Supreme Court has been totally incompetent and weak on the massive Election
Fraud . . . We have absolute PROOF, but they don’t want to see it . . . If we have corrupt
elections, we have no country!”).
13. H.R. Res. 24, supra note 11.
14. Phillip Bump, The Central Flaw in Trump’s Impeachment Defense, WASH. POST (Feb.
8, 2021, 1:09 PM), https://wapo.st/3AWC4DI; Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER
(Jan. 5, 2021, 5:43:07 PM), https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22Save+America%22.
15. DHS reported a “heightened threat environment during the 2020–2021 election
season, including the extent to which the political transition and political polarization are
contributing to the mobilization of individuals to commit violence.” Josh Margolin & Lucien
Bruggeman, Months Ahead of Capitol Riot, DHS Threat Assessment Group Was Gutted: Officials,
ABC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2021, 5:18 PM), https://abcn.ws/3mm2QkG.
16. Wamsley, supra note 9. For a description of the Proud Boys, see Rachael Levy & Erin
Ailworth, Who Are the Proud Boys? Canada Names Far-Right Group a Terrorist Organization, WALL
ST. J. (Feb. 5, 2021, 5:02 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/who-are-proud-boys-11601485755.
17. See, e.g., John Haltiwanger, Trump Has Repeatedly Been Endorsed by White
Supremacist Groups and Other Far-Right Extremists, and They’ve Looked to Him as a Source of
Encouragement,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Sept.
30,
2020,
1:59
PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/trumps-history-of-support-from-white-supremacistfar-right-groups-2020-9.
18. Proud Boys, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, https://www.adl.org/proudboys (last
visited Oct. 7, 2021).
19. Id.;
Proud
Boys,
S.
POVERTY
L.
CTR.,
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/proud-boys (last visited
Oct. 7, 2021).
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that the DCNG go to alert status.20 Unfortunately, the Capitol Police
Board denied the request,21 and D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser did not
declare an emergency in advance.22 On January 5, the Norfolk FBI
field office shared information with D.C. law enforcement that
contained specific threats against Congress.23 Yet D.C. authorities
recommended not deploying additional forces.24 Mayor Bowser
only asked for 340 unarmed DCNG to provide traffic control.25
On January 6, Trump began his remarks at the “Save America”
rally shortly before noon.26 Meanwhile, MPD discovered two
unexploded pipe bombs at 12:45 p.m., one each at the Republican
and Democratic National Committee headquarters.27 At 1:11 p.m.,
Trump concluded his remarks.28 Then, as one journalist reported, a
“huge crush of people c[ame] down Pennsylvania Ave.[,] . . . quickly
overwhelmed” Capitol Police, and breached the Capitol.29

20. Wamsley, supra note 9; Rebecca Shabad, Acting U.S. Capitol Police Chief Says
Department “Failed” During Jan. 6 Riot, NBC NEWS (Jan. 26, 2021), https://bit.ly/3mR0KI6.
21. Wamsley, supra note 9.
22. Shabad, supra note 20.
23. Wamsley, supra note 9.
24. Id. The MPD, the U.S. Capitol Police, the U.S. Park Police, and the FBI Washington
Field Office decided there was not enough specificity. Id.
25. Id. The Mayor did not want “other federal law enforcement personnel.” Muriel
Bowser
(@MayorBowser),
TWITTER
(Jan.
5,
2021,
11:53
AM),
https://twitter.com/MayorBowser/status/1346530358674792466. She was concerned about
a repeat of June 1, 2020, where federal law enforcement aggressively cleared Lafayette
Square. See id.; Tom Gjelten, Peaceful Protesters Tear-Gassed to Clear Way for Trump Church
Photo-Op, NPR (June 1, 2020, 11:50 PM), http://n.pr/2NXNTqh.
26. Wamsley, supra note 9.
27. Id.
28. See Trump, supra note 3 (“All of us here today do not want to see our election
victory stolen by emboldened radical-left Democrats, which is what they’re doing. And
stolen by the fake news media.”; “We will not take it anymore and that’s what this is all
about. . . . We will stop the steal.”; “We will not let them silence your voices. We’re not going
to let it happen . . . .”; “Today is not the end, it’s just the beginning.”; “So . . . we’re going to
walk down Pennsylvania Avenue . . . and we’re going to the Capitol . . . .”).
29. Wamsley, supra note 9; see Devlin Barrett & Spencer S. Hsu, Justice Department,
FBI Debate Not Charging Some of the Capitol Rioters, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2021, 1:21 PM),
https://wapo.st/3ihaJ8O (estimating that about 800 people entered the Capitol building); Vice
News,
Inside
the
Capitol
Hill
Riots,
YOUTUBE
(Jan.
9,
2021),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lfP_5L8epow; Katherine Gypson, Stunning New
Video Reveals Scope of Jan. 6 Capitol Riot, VOICE O F AM. (Feb. 11, 2021, 12:04 AM),
https://www.voanews.com/a/episode_stunning-new-video-reveals-scope-jan-6-capitolriot-4574706/6114911.html.
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Authorities alerted Congress, which was certifying the election,
and both chambers sheltered in place.30
As rioters surrounded the Capitol, the Capitol Police Chief and
Mayor Bowser both called for reinforcements.31 Sources dispute
what happened then at the Pentagon. Some officials claim they
heard the Director of the Army Staff say that the Secretary of the
Army would not approve the request for DCNG activation, while
the Director himself asserts that the Secretary ran to the Defense
Secretary’s office.32 Meanwhile, Trump tweeted, “USA demands
the truth!”33
Over the next half hour, rioters who had breached the Capitol
building committed a range of actions from threatening violence
against officers and legislators to roaming the halls. Some, attired
in military gear and using walkie-talkies and code names, seemed
to be searching for legislators.34 Others took selfies and camped
out in Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s chair.35 Due to the threat of
violence, law enforcement shepherded Congress to a safer
location and evacuated the Cannon House Office Building.36 Over
the next few hours, four people died: two from natural causes, one
from amphetamine intoxication, and one killed by Capitol police
after she attempted to access the chamber where Congress was
being evacuated.37

30. Wamsley, supra note 9.
31. Id. At 2:22 p.m., Mayor Bowser and the Capitol Police Chief were on a call with
Pentagon officials, where the Chief said, “I am making an urgent, urgent immediate request
for National Guard assistance. . . . I have got to get boots on the ground.” Id.
32. Id.
33. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Jan. 6, 2021, 2:24:22 PM),
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22USA+demands%22.
34. Dan Zak & Karen Heller, What Were the Capitol Rioters Thinking on Jan. 6?, WASH.
POST (July 20, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://wapo.st/3z57IOz.
35. Id.
36. At Least Two Buildings Near US Capitol Complex Evacuated amid Protests ,
NBC
WASH.
(Jan.
6,
2021,
2:43
PM),
https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/at-least-two-buildings-near-us-capitolcomplex-evacuated-amid-protests/2531447/.
37. Peter Hermann & Steve Thompson, D.C. Medical Examiner Releases Cause of Death
for Four People Who Died During Capitol Riot, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2021, 7:24 PM),
https://wapo.st/3ghUmai; Tom Winter & Dareh Gregorian, No Charges for Capitol Police
Officer Who Shot Jan. 6 Rioter, Justice Department Says, NBC NEWS (Apr. 14, 2021, 11:57 AM),
https://nbcnews.to/3j84vbP; Wamsley, supra note 9; Vice News, Inside the Capitol Hill Riots,
YOUTUBE (Jan. 9, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lfP_5L8epow.
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At 3:04 p.m., the Secretary of the Army determined that the
DCNG was needed to secure the Capitol and the acting Secretary
of Defense approved the Army Secretary’s plan to activate 1,100
DCNG.38 Thirty minutes later, the White House Press Secretary
tweeted that Trump had directed the DCNG to protect the
Capitol.39 However, it was Vice President Pence, not President
Trump, who called the acting Secretary of Defense at 4:08 p.m. and
demanded an update.40 At 4:17 p.m., the President told protestors
to “go home in peace,” while also saying, “[w]e had an election that
was stolen from us.”41 The Guard arrived at the Capitol at 5:40 p.m.
and secured the area by 8 p.m.42
B. Impeachment and Insurrection
Congress’s impeachment of President Trump exemplified the
collective anger against the President for January 6 and the
frustration that he was the only person who could deploy the
DCNG. The impeachment article alleged a serious crime: Trump
incited an insurrection.43 And the January 6 riot meets the standard
of an insurrection laid out in the Constitution and federal law.
Thus, the insurrection, supported in part by Trump’s action and
inaction, lends strong support to voices that contend the President
should not have control of the DCNG.
38. Wamsley, supra note 9; Associated Press, ‘Clear the Capitol,’ Pence Pleaded, Timeline
of
Riot
Shows,
U.S.
NEWS
(Apr.
10,
2021),
https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2021-04-10/clear-the-capitol-pencepleaded-timeline-of-riot-shows.
39. Kayleigh McEnany (@PressSec45), TWITTER (Jan. 6, 2021, 1:36 PM), https://twitter.com/
presssec45/status/1346918582832168964?lang=en (“At President @realDonaldTrump’s direction, the
National Guard is on the way along with other federal protective services. We reiterate President
Trump’s call against violence and to remain peaceful.”). Of course, there is debate over whether the
President did, in fact, authorize the DCNG’s deployment. The New York Times and CNN
reported that “President Trump initially rebuffed and resisted requests to mobilize the National
Guard to quell violent protests at the Capitol, according to a person with knowledge of the
events.” Maggie Haberman & Helene Cooper, Trump Rebuffed Initial Requests to Deploy the National
Guard to the Capitol. Pence Gave the Go-Ahead, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021, 8:31 AM),
http://nyti.ms/3uR0pIC; Kaitlan Collins, Zachary Cohen, Barbara Starr & Jennifer Hansler, Pence
Took Lead as Trump Initially Resisted Sending National Guard to Capitol, CNN (Jan. 7, 2021, 11:39 AM),
http://cnn.it/3kH4oD3. The N.Y. Times also reported that Vice President Pence gave the order,
assisted by the White House Counsel. Haberman & Cooper, supra.
40. Associated Press, supra note 38.
41. Wamsley, supra note 9.
42. Id; Associated Press, supra note 38.
43. H.R. Res. 24, 117th Cong. (2021).
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Two days after the riot, the House drafted an impeachment
article for “Incitement of Insurrection” against President Trump.44
The article alleged that “Trump engaged in high Crimes and
Misdemeanors by inciting violence against the Government of the
United States.”45 Specifically, it charged that Trump “repeatedly
issued false statements” in the months before the election, claimed
“widespread fraud,” and “willfully made statements that, in
context, encouraged—and foreseeably resulted in—lawless action
at the Capitol.”46 The article of impeachment passed.47 During the
Senate trial, the impeachment manager pled: “If that is not ground
for conviction, if that is not a high crime and misdemeanor against
the Republic and the United States of America, then nothing is.”48
Although the Senate acquitted him, all of the events surrounding
the January 6 riot, including Trump’s encouraging of more than
8,000 supporters to march against Congress, indicate that the riot at
the Capitol was an insurrection.49
In Article I of the Constitution, Congress has the power to “call[]
forth the Militia” to “suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”50
But these do not include ordinary threats that local law
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Jeremy Herb, Manu Raju, Lauren Fox & Phil Mattingly, House Impeaches Trump for
‘Incitement of Insurrection’, CNN (Jan. 13, 2021, 8:23 PM), http://cnn.it/2O0vd9d (showing
that, with a vote of 217 to 192, the vote was not on party lines).
48. Nicholas Fandos & Emily Cochrane, 7 Senate Republicans Vote ‘Guilty,’ the Most
Bipartisan Margin in Favor of Conviction in History, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2021, 4:42 AM),
http://nyti.ms/3kEMLDW (quoting Representative Jamie Raskin, lead impeachment
manager).
49. Impeachment Trial: Trump Is Acquitted by the Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2021),
http://nyti.ms/3kEMLDW; Dan Berry, Mike McIntire & Matthew Rosenberg, “Our
President Wants Us Here”: The Mob that Stormed the Capitol, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/us/capitol-rioters.html; see also Victoria Bekiempis,
Trump’s Acquittal Shows Paltry Punch of Impeachment Process, GUARDIAN (Feb. 14, 2021, 2:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/feb/14/trump-impeachment-acquittal-processpolitics. Acquittal was not the end of the story for Trump. Recently, several lawmakers sought
to join a federal lawsuit against the former President, alleging that “Trump, along with Rudy
Guiliani [sic], the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers, conspired to incite the riot to prevent
Congress from certifying the 2020 Presidential election.” Jeremy Schneider, Kaptur Joins
Lawsuits Alleging Trump Conspired to Obstruct Congressional Business with Jan. 6 Riots, 13 ABC
ACTION NEWS (Apr. 7, 2021, 10:33 AM), https://www.13abc.com/2021/04/07/kaptur-joinslawsuit-alleging-trump-conspired-to-obstruct-congressional-business-with-jan-6-riots/;
Associated Press, supra note 38.
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
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enforcement could handle. As Professor William Banks explains,
the Founders envisioned that only extreme threats like foreign
invasions, armed insurrections against the government, or direct
affronts to a republican form of government would justify
deploying federal military to states absent a governor’s request for
aid.51 January 6 rioters were not foreign invaders, nor were they an
organized, armed group intent on toppling the government.52
Rather, the January 6 riot was an insurrection because it constituted
a direct threat to the states’ guarantee of a republican form of
government.53 Many of the rioters marched to the Capitol to stop
the election certification of Joseph Biden.54 And they succeeded.
Rioters prevented state representatives from certifying the election,
and by extension, the citizens of all fifty states’ selection of a
President through certification of their state electoral processes.
Legislation further validates the characterization of January 6
as an insurrection. The Insurrection Act refers to an insurrection
as including “domestic violence, unlawful combination, or
conspiracy.”55 An insurrection exists when persons obstruct the
execution of laws so that others are deprived of rights or privileges
51. William C. Banks, Providing “Supplemental Security”—The Insurrection Act and the
Military Role in Responding to Domestic Crises, 3 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 39, 41 (2009). The
Framers feared domestic violence. See Jason Mazzone, The Security Constitution, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 29, 50–51 (2005) (highlighting the Framers’ debates over including a constitutional
provision that the federal government would guarantee security against foreign invasions
and “domestic violence”). Hamilton wrote of “dangers of a different and, perhaps, still more
alarming kind . . . from domestic factions . . . .” THE FEDERALIST NO. 6, at 54 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). He also declared that “[a]n insurrection . . . eventually
endangers all government.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 178 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961). That said, the Constitution provides a guarantor of “additional securities
to republican government.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, at 521 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
52. Granted, the rioters were armed with items like baseball bats, pepper spray, and
flagpoles. See Tom Dreisbach & Tim Mak, Yes, Capitol Rioters Were Armed. Here Are the
Weapons Prosecutors Say They Used, NPR (Mar. 19, 2021, 5:06 AM), https://n.pr/3kqpmqf;
Holmes Lybrand, Fact Checking Claims January 6 Was Not an Armed Insurrection, CNN POLITICS
(July 28, 2021, 5:23 PM), https://cnn.it/3sy5dSr. However, the rioters were intent on
stopping the election count, not installing a new government. See Robert A. Pape & Keven Ruby,
The Capitol Rioters Aren’t Like Other Extremists, ATLANTIC (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/
ideas/archive/2021/02/the-capitol-rioters-arent-like-other-extremists/617895/.
53. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007
MICH. ST. L. REV. 293, 301 (2007) (arguing that the Framers “thought that a republican form
of government was one where people would elect representatives, and the representatives
would then make the laws”).
54. Pape & Ruby, supra note 52.
55. 10 U.S.C. § 253 (2016).
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and the state is unable to protect their rights.56 Also, an insurrection
can occur when an armed group opposes or obstructs the execution
of the laws directly.57 The January 6 riot fits both prongs. Violence
prevented Congress from certifying the election results,58 and law
enforcement could not protect the Capitol.59
Some Republican lawmakers balk at referring to January 6 as an
insurrection. One representative minimized those who stormed the
Capitol, calling them mere protesters.60 Another representative
labeled the rioters “an undisciplined mob.”61 Borrowing a phrase
from coverage of the 2020 Black Lives Matter phenomenon,62 one
senator rejected the idea that January 6 was an insurrection, calling
it “largely a ‘peaceful protest.’”63
January 6 was an insurrection, however, because it was a direct
threat against the states’ guarantee of a republican form of
government and thus qualifies as an insurrection under the
Insurrection Act. Accordingly, the insurrection, supported in part
by Trump’s action and inaction, lends strong support to those that
contend the President should not have control of the DCNG. But as
this Note demonstrates in Parts II–IV, the President should remain
the commander of the DCNG.64

56. § 253(1).
57. § 253(2).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. XII (“The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate
and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The
person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President.”).
59. Thus, the “state” was unable to “protect that right.” § 253(1).
60. Cristina Marcos, GOP Increasingly Balks at Calling Jan. 6 an Insurrection, HILL (June
19, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/559217-gop-increasingly-balksat-calling-jan-6-an-insurrection. (“‘They were protesting. And I don’t approve of the way
they protested, but it wasn’t an insurrection,’ said Rep. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.).”).
61. Id. (quoting Rep. Andrew Clyde (R-Ga.)).
62. See, e.g., Tara Adhikari, BLM and Floyd Protests Were Largely Peaceful, Data Confirms,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(July
8,
2021),
https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2021/0708/BLM-and-Floyd-protests-werelargely-peaceful-data-confirms.
63. Marcos, supra note 60 (quoting Sen. Ron Johnson (R-Wis.)).
64. This Note addresses the question of whether the President should command the
DCNG. Perhaps the House’s Jan. 6 Commission will answer why the DCNG was not
deployed earlier. See Nat’l Comm’n to Investigate the Jan. 6 Attack on the U.S. Capitol
Complex Act, H.R. 3233, 117th Cong. (2021).
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C. D.C. and the DCNG
To give proper context for the remainder of the Note, this
section explores what makes D.C. different from the fifty states, the
D.C. statehood movement, and the DCNG. First, Washington, D.C.,
differs from every other American polity. The federal district
evolved from a collection of ugly buildings sitting on “unpaved,
muddy cesspools”65 to its present grandeur.66 This evolution
occurred because of its role as the capital city. The Constitution
speaks to D.C.’s existence in Article I, Section 8, as “not exceeding
ten Miles square,” formed by “Cession of particular States.”67 The
Framers vigorously debated the Capital’s location.68 Indeed, as
Whit Cobb remarks, the Framers declined to place the nation’s
capital in an existing state to assuage regional jealousies and ensure
the federal government’s safety and dignity.69 While D.C. has not
remained the utopia Jeffersonians envisioned,70 the capital compact
persists in part because the citizens of D.C. have upheld their part
of the bargain by not seeking local political control.71 That is not to
deny that the statehood movement is straining that bargain.72 Even
so, the Framers’ vision of a district free from state influence should
endure despite calls for change.73
65. LARRY SCHWEIKART & MICHAEL ALLEN, A PATRIOT’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
153 (2004) (quoting PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 234 (1997)).
66. See WASHINGTON, D.C., https://washington.org/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
68. Whit Cobb, Democracy in Search of Utopia: The History, Law, and Politics of Relocating
the National Capital, 99 DICK. L. REV. 527, 531 (1995) (“The Constitution’s framers were
politically sophisticated enough to know that the designation of a site for the national capital
would be fiercely contested.”).
69. Id. at 530.
70. See id. at 535 (discussing the Framers who saw the national capital as an agrarian
paradise, free from the influence of “urban mobs”).
71. Id. at 550.
72. See infra Part III.
73. At least one voice demands full D.C. representation in Congress so that the United
States meets international law. Johnny Barnes contends that the United States violates
international treaties and customary international law by denying D.C. citizens full
representation in the national legislature. Johnny Barnes, Towards Equal Footing: Responding
to the Perceived Constitutional, Legal and Practical Impediments to Statehood for the District of
Columbia, 13 D.C. L. REV. 1, 48–56 (2010) (citing international law as a way to grant D.C.
statehood). Calls for statehood would mitigate the risk of a rogue President sparking another
Capitol riot, but it would also raise tension between the federal government versus the local
government when politics do not align. Cf. Mike DeBonis & Meagan Flynn, “It’s Not a Local

722

723

Commander in Chief of the DCNG

Second, though Congress has at times created independent
governments for D.C., it has never given D.C. full autonomy. In
1871, Congress passed legislation molding the District of Columbia
into a municipal corporation which could contract with other
parties and sue in court.74 But three years later, Congress repealed
the act based on rampant “corruption, wanton spending, debt,
bankruptcy, and public outcry.”75 A three-member commission
then governed D.C. until 1967 when a city council replaced the
commissioners.76 Most recently, Congress approved the District of
Columbia Home Rule Act of 1973.77
However, many reject the current D.C. model in favor of
statehood. Mayor Bowser and the Government of D.C. sponsor the
website, State of Washington, D.C.78 The website contends that D.C.
residents are denied equality with other U.S. citizens even though
D.C. citizens pay federal taxes and serve in the federal military,
while the city operates its own school system, manages Medicaid
programs, and is fiscally independent.79 Rep. Norton and most of
her constituents80 see statehood as necessary to achieve equality.81
Issue Anymore”: D.C. Statehood Moves from Political Fringe to the Center of the National Democratic
Agenda, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2021, 1:11 PM), http://wapo.st/2Pg4JkA (remarking that
President Biden shouted to D.C.’s representative Eleanor Norton, “You should be a state!”).
74. District of Columbia Organic Act of 1871, ch. 62, 16 Stat. 419.
75. R. HEWITT PATE, HERITAGE FOUND., THE HERITAGE LECTURES, PUB. NO. 461, D.C.
STATEHOOD: NOT WITHOUT A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 2 (Aug. 27, 1993),
https://www.heritage.org/political-process/report/dc-statehood-not-without-constitutional-ame
ndment.
76. Mark David Richards, History of Local Government in Washington, D.C., DC VOTE
(2002), https://dcvotearchive.org/inside-dc/history-local-government-washington-dc.
77. D.C. Home Rule, COUNCIL OF D.C., https://dccouncil.us/dc-home-rule/ (last visited
Apr. 8, 2021). “The Council is composed of a Chairman elected at large and twelve Members—
four of whom are elected at large, and one from each of the District’s eight wards.” Id.
78. See generally State of D.C., STATE OF WASHINGTON, DC, https://statehood.dc.gov/
(last visited Aug. 19, 2021).
79. About
DC
Statehood,
STATE
OF
WASHINGTON,
DC,
https://statehood.dc.gov/page/about-dc-statehood (last visited Aug. 19, 2021).
80. See, e.g., District of Columbia Advisory Referendum B—Statehood Proposal—Results:
Approved, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017, 11:23 AM), http://nyti.ms/3vgLBDg (showing that
85.8% of D.C. voters approved the statehood proposal).
81. 167 CONG. REC. E1 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 2021) (statement of Rep. Eleanor Holmes Norton).
Even some Republicans hint at giving D.C. residents representation. See Maggie Baldridge, Should
the District of Columbia Become the 51st State?, NAT’L CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY (Mar. 31, 2017),
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/should-the-district-of-columbia-become-the-51st-state (“In
an interview on NBC’s ‘Meet the Press’ during the 2016 Presidential campaign, now-President
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Statehood may also be constitutional and legal.82 As Rep. Raskin
and Rep. Norton assert, granting D.C. statehood is the only way to
grant political equality for D.C. residents who cannot vote on any
federal laws.83
The statehood movement must overcome obstacles. To begin,
the Senate is unlikely to pass a D.C. statehood bill. During the 116th
Congress, six Democrats even refused to co-sponsor the
legislation.84 Republican senators have called the bill
“unconstitutional,” a “‘Democratic power grab’ that would
‘empower the most radical agenda in modern American politics[,]’”
and a “bad deal.”85 There is also a practical reason Republicans may
not support statehood—votes. Since D.C. citizens gained the right
to vote for President, they have voted overwhelmingly for

Donald Trump said that he supports ‘whatever’s best’ for D.C. residents, including the possibility
of statehood. Vice President Mike Pence has also shown support for D.C. statehood in the past: in
2007, he said that the lack of representation for D.C.’s residents a ‘historic wrong.’”). However,
Rep. Norton’s bill likely does not have enough votes; there are only 215 cosponsors in the House
and 42 in the Senate. See Lex Juarez, D.C. Statehood Bill Mark-Up and Vote to Be Held April 14, WDVM
(Mar. 31, 2021, 10:55 PM), https://www.localdvm.com/news/washington-dc/d-c-statehoodbill-mark-up-and-vote-to-be-held-april-14/.
82. See Peter Raven-Hansen, The Constitutionality of D.C. Statehood, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 160 (1991); Jamin B. Raskin, Domination, Democracy, and the District: The Statehood
Position, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 417, 419 (1990).
83. Raskin, supra note 82, at 425; D.C. Statehood, CONG. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
https://norton.house.gov/issues/why-dc-should-be-a-state (last visited Aug. 20, 2021). As
some D.C. license plates state, “Taxation Without Representation.” Year-by-Year Guide to D.C.
Passenger Car License Plates, DCPLATES.NET, http://dcplates.com/Pre-1966.htm#Link2015
(last visited Aug. 20, 2021).
84. Meagan Flynn & Teddy Amenabar, Will D.C. Become a State? Explaining the Hurdles
to Statehood, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2021, 5:43 PM), http://wapo.st/38qiGmr. The filibuster
stands as an insurmountable obstacle. Two Democrat senators, Joe Manchin and Kyrsten
Sinema, have “publicly reiterated their previously stated opposition to eliminating the
filibuster.” Mike DeBonis, McConnell Relents on Senate Rules, Signals Power-Sharing Deal with
Democrats, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2021, 9:14 PM), http://wapo.st/3qCiYNi.
85. Ali Zaslav & Haley Byrd, Senate Republicans Fiercely Oppose DC Statehood as Political
‘Power Grab,’ CNN POLITICS (July 1, 2020, 4:16 PM), http://cnn.it/3bAMH55.
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Democratic candidates.86 It would be a fair guess that D.C. as a state
would continue supporting the Democratic party.87
As some Senators argue, granting statehood conflicts with
original intent. The Framers rejected the notion that an existing
state would host the capital.88 D.C. is the national capital; no state
should have undue influence over national politics. Mr. Madison
warned that the accumulation of power in the nation’s capital
would be too great a temptation for a single state.89 And Article I
gives Congress the enumerated power to pass legislation in D.C.,
and Congress has not relinquished that right.90 Also, fear of undue
influence over the national government from three quarters of a
million D.C. citizens who control a $15.5 billion budget likely
remains a substantial factor in stalling the D.C. statehood
movement.91 Even January 6 will likely not overcome one
commentator’s argument, based on a reading of Mr. Madison’s
Federalist No. 43, that an independent capital is “a critical part of
the Framers’ original design for an indestructible federal union of
indestructible states.”92 In sum, D.C. statehood is not likely to

86. United States Presidential Elections in Washington, D.C., WIKIPEDIA (Jan. 15, 2021, 2:56 AM),
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_elections_in_Washington,_D.C. District
voters supported the winning Presidential candidate in these percentages: Johnson, 1964, 85.5%;
Nixon, 1968, 18.2%; Nixon, 1972, 21.6%, Carter, 1976, 81.6%; Reagan, 1980, 13.3%; Reagan, 1984,
13.7%; Bush, 1988, 14.3%; Clinton, 1992, 84.6%; Clinton, 1996, 85.2%; Bush, 2000, 8.9%; Bush, 2004,
9.3%; Obama, 2008 92.5%; Obama, 2012, 90.9%; Trump, 2016, 4.1%; and Biden, 2020, 92.2%. Id.
87. Rep. Norton secured 86.3% of the vote in 2020. Eleanor Holmes Norton,
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Eleanor_Holmes_Norton (last visited Apr. 8, 2021).
As John Kasich said in 2016, “That’s just more votes in the Democratic party.” David Smith,
New Columbia? Washington DC Sees New Hope in Fight for Statehood, GUARDIAN (June 12, 2016,
8:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/12/washington-dc-statehood51st-state-bernie-sanders.
88. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (creating the District “by Cession of particular States”).
89. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 272 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[T]he
gradual accumulation of public improvements at the stationary residence of the government
would be both too great a public pledge to be left in the hands of a single State, and would
create so many obstacles to a removal of the government, as still further to abridge its
necessary independence.”).
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
91. See
Why
Statehood
for
DC,
STATE
OF
WASHINGTON,
DC,
https://statehood.dc.gov/page/about-dc-statehood (last visited Aug. 19, 2021) (describing D.C.’s
population and budget).
92. LEE A. CASEY, HERITAGE FOUND., WEB MEMO, PUB. NO. 1404, THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE
DISTRICT
OF
COLUMBIA
3
(Mar.
22,
2007),
https://www.heritage.org/the-constitution/report/the-constitution-and-the-district-columbia
(summarizing THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 272 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
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become a political reality in the near future despite strong
arguments for full representation.
Third, military operations in D.C. are distinct. In 1802, Congress
passed legislation that created the District of Columbia Militia93
shortly after the President and Congress took up residence.94 But
after a series of internal rebellions—Shays’s Rebellion,95 the
Whiskey Rebellion,96 and Fries’s Rebellion,97—some feared an
armed force would cross the Potomac and lay siege to the capital.98
So unlike state militias, the DCNG retains a national mission: to
obey orders of the President of the United States and stand ready
to deploy overseas.99
The DCNG also responds to domestic disturbances and
performs other functions like parades, civic celebrations, and

93.

CTR. FOR L. & MIL. OPERATIONS, DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL LAW, 2018 HANDBOOK
at 49, 73 (2018).
94. See
The
Senate
Moves
to
Washington,
U.S.
SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/The_Senate_Moves_to_Washing
ton.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2021); Frederick P. Todd, The Militia and Volunteers at the District
of Columbia 1783–1820, in 50 RECS. COLUM. HIST. SOC’Y 379, 387 (1948).
95. See generally DAVID P. SZATMARY, SHAYS’ REBELLION: THE MAKING OF AN
AGRARIAN INSURRECTION (1980) (describing how a group of New England farmers began a
campaign of social banditry, localized attacks, and open rebellion in 1786–77 when creditors
demanded repayment of debts in specie).
96. See generally WILLIAM HOGELAND, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: GEORGE WASHINGTON,
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, AND THE FRONTIER REBELS WHO CHALLENGED AMERICA’S
NEWFOUND SOVEREIGNTY (2006) (chronicling the 1791–94 rebellion, in which frontiersmen’s
refusal to pay federal excise taxes escalated into plotting a government insurgency).
97. See
generally
Fries’s
Rebellion,
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/event/Friess-Rebellion (last visited Apr. 8, 2021) (giving an
overview of Fries’s Rebellion, in which President Adams in 1799 called out federal troops
and militia to suppress a group of German farmers who marched to Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania to liberate federal tax protesters).
98. Even President Washington was not immune from insinuations that the successful
general would reenact Caesar crossing the Rubicon. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The
Past, Present, and Future of Presidential Power, 14 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 627, 637 (2018) (citation
omitted) (“Jeffersonians called Washington an ‘embryo-Caesar[.]’”); see also The Founding of
a Legacy, D.C. NAT’L GUARD, https://dc.ng.mil/About-Us/Heritage/DC-National-GuardMuseum/Exhibits/The-Foundation-of-a-Legacy/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2021) (discussing the
fear that the “will of a military general could keep the legislative body from enacting the will
of the people”).
99. Mission & Vision, D.C. NAT’L GUARD, https://dc.ng.mil/About-Us/MissionVision/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2021). Additionally, some scholars envision the entire National
Guard structure, not just the DCNG, as “for all practical purposes, a federal force.” Charles
J. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military, 29 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 341, 384 (1994) (footnote omitted).
FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES
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natural disasters.100 President Johnson activated the Guard after Dr.
Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination.101 And as riots in response
to George Floyd’s murder intensified,102 President Trump called up
the National Guard in twenty-three states and the District to
“dominate the streets” and “end[] the riots and lawlessness that has
spread throughout our country.”103 Seven months later, the DCNG
mobilized again to protect the Capitol building.104
II. AUTHORITY TO COMMAND THE DCNG
D.C., as a politically neutral polity that functions as the nation’s
capital, must have a military force commanded by the chief
executive notwithstanding the January 6 insurrection. In fact,
presidential authority to command the DCNG flows from the
Constitution and federal statutes. Articles II and I of the
Constitution provide the basis for the President’s power over the

100. The DCNG is a “responsive, dependable force for . . . Independence Day
celebrations” and other civic events like “the Million Man March, the Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr. Memorial dedication and state funerals.” See Past and Post War, D.C. NAT’L GUARD,
https://dc.ng.mil/About-Us/Heritage/History/Past-and-post-war/ (last visited Apr. 8,
2021). The DCNG also responds to natural disasters, such as “Hurricane Katrina, the blizzard
of ‘96, the ‘Snowpocalypse’ blizzard of 2010, Hurricane Irene, Hurricane Sandy and many
other[s].” Id.
101. See id. One eyewitness to the 1968 riots said, “[i]t looked like a war zone.” Danielle
Rindler et al., The Four Days in 1968 that Reshaped D.C., WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2018),
http://wapo.st/3rnc4wM. Ultimately, over 13,000 troops would occupy Washington,
D.C.—the most in an American city until January 2021. Id. By the presidential inauguration
on January 20, 2021, there were almost 26,000 National Guard in D.C. Karoun Demirjian &
Alex Horton, National Guard’s Capitol Security Mission Ends as Lawmakers Feud over Protection
Needs, Costs, WASH. POST. (May 24, 2021, 5:06 PM), https://wapo.st/3kupDtp.
102. See generally Derrick Bryson Taylor, George Floyd Protests: A Timeline, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 7, 2021), http://nyti.ms/3e9A4zH.
103. Ryan Browne, Alicia Lee & Renee Rigdon, There Are as Many National Guard
Members Activated in the US as There Are Active Duty Troops in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, CNN
(June 1, 2020, 11:48 PM), http://cnn.it/3sR0cUg. Media reported the DCNG and police using
smoke canisters, pepper balls, horses, shields, and batons to clear Lafayette Square. Gen
Gittleson & Jordyn Phelps, Police Use Munitions to Forcibly Push Back Peaceful Protestors from
Trump Church Visit, ABC NEWS (June 2, 2020, 6:36 PM), http://abcn.ws/3sMlsuf.
104. That said, it is disputed whether President Trump explicitly gave the order to
mobilize the DCNG. See Lauren Giella, Fact Check: Did Trump Call in the National Guard After
Rioters Stormed the Capitol?, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 8, 2021, 7:15 PM), https://bit.ly/3nWcqf8; see
also Alexander Mallin & Beatrice Peterson, Lawmakers Grill Officials on Jan. 6 Timeline for
Deploying National Guard to Capitol, ABC NEWS (Mar. 3, 2021, 3:25 PM),
http://abcn.ws/3epyHwS (discussing whether the acting Secretary of Defense, Secretary of
the Army, or commander of the DCNG made the call).
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Guard. Cementing that power are executive orders, federal
statutes, and D.C. laws.
A. The President
1. Article II powers
Article II grants the President the commander in chief and
executive powers.105 The President “shall be Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the
several States, when called into the actual Service of the United
States.”106 To guide that power, the Constitution gives clear
commander’s intent.107 The President must take an oath or
affirmation to “faithfully execute the office of President of the
United States, and . . . to the best of [his] Ability, preserve, protect
and defend the Constitution . . . .”108 Also, the Executive “shall take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed[.]”109 Thus, the
Constitution directs the Commander in Chief to follow, not his own
whims, but those of the American people. And, as the
Constitution’s preamble states, “We the People” established the
Constitution that thus gave the President his authority.

105. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; § 2, cl. 1.
106. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Of course, it took faith for the Republic to give the Chief
Executive even partial power over state militia. The colonies had just won independence
from George III, characterized as “[a] Prince whose character is thus marked by every act
which may define a Tyrant[.]” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776).
Some, like Patrick Henry, feared “a King . . . in the field, at the head of his army, [who] can
prescribe the terms on which he shall reign master, so far that it will puzzle any American
ever to get his neck from under the galling yoke.” Patrick Henry, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST
PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 214 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986).
107. The U.S. Army defines commander’s intent:
The commander’s intent describes the desired endstate. It is a concise statement of
the purpose of the operation and must be understood two levels below the level
of the issuing commander. It must clearly state the purpose of the mission. It is the
single unifying focus for all subordinate elements. It is not a summary of the
concept of the operation. Its purpose is to focus subordinates on what has to be
accomplished in order to achieve success, even when the plan and concept no
longer apply, and to discipline their efforts toward that end.
Lawrence G. Shattuck, Communicating Intent and Imparting Presence, MIL. REV. 66, 67 (Mar.–
Apr. 2000) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Operations, FM 100-5 at 6-6 (June 1993),
https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/amd-us-archive/fm100-5(93).pdf).
108. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
109. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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Even so, the Commander in Chief Clause needs two
clarifications. First, “called into the actual Service” means that the
President cannot direct the Guard unless it is in federal service.110
However, D.C. is a federal district and thereby subject to
Congress’s legislation exclusively. As section II.B discusses, both
Congress and the D.C. Council have asserted through law that the
President commands the DCNG.111 And so the President need not
“call up” the DCNG as he would a state’s National Guard. Second,
the District of Columbia is not a state.112 Even if one reads the
Clause narrowly to exclude the President’s command of D.C.’s
National Guard, legislation—the Insurrection Act and D.C. Code
section 49-409—confirms his power over the DCNG.113
Next, the Constitution grants the President the executive
power.114 This authority combines with the commander in chief
power to give the President broad leeway over military affairs. So,
even if laws were silent on who controls the DCNG, the President’s
dual role as commander in chief and chief executive means that he
rightly commands military units, especially during an insurrection.
That said, the Executive Clause, as Professor Saikrishna
Prakash explains, is an enigma.115 Under one interpretation, the
President’s executive power is like a king’s.116 The President leads

110. See, e.g., Howard Altman & Leo Shane III, Trump Provides Federal Funds for National
Guard in Three States; They Keep Control, Federal Government Foots Bill as COVID-19 Cases Rise,
MILITARY TIMES (Mar. 22, 2020), https://bit.ly/3zztWYL (describing Trump’s activation of
the National Guard in three states under Title 32).
111. See D.C. CODE § 49-409 (2021); Scott R. Anderson, Emma Broches, Eric Halliday & Julia
Solomon-Strauss, What Made Trump’s Protest Response in D.C. Unique?, LAWFARE (June 8, 2020, 2:41
PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-made-trumps-protest-response-dc-unique (describing
how D.C. “is in a different situation from the states”).
112. U.S. C ONST . art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (“To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of
particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government
of the United States . . . .”).
113. See 10 U.S.C. § 255 (2016) (including Guam and the Virgin Islands, both territories,
under the Insurrection Act); D.C. CODE § 49-409 (2021) (naming the President commander in
chief of the DCNG).
114. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
115. Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, U. ILL. L. REV. 701,
701, 703 (2003); see also E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So
Abysmal, 57 GEO. WASH L. REV. 506, 532 (1989) (“This conundrum is a difficult one . . . .”).
116. See Prakash, supra note 115, at 750 (citing JOHN LOUIS DE LOLME, THE
CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND 171 (William S. Hein ed., 1999) (1784)). (There are “many
different types of ‘executive power’: foreign affairs authority [and] military control[.]”).
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a “unitary, hierarchical executive branch” and has the right to
execute laws affecting military and international affairs.117
Responding to a sudden attack in the capital, the President thus has
power to mobilize requisite forces to defend the nation.118
Others, like Professor Richard Epstein, take a more limited view
of the President’s powers.119 Professor Epstein argues that the
executive and commander in chief powers should not allow the
President to ignore treaties or statutes, or to have inherent power
over the militia.120 Instead, the President should command the
militia only when it is called into federal service.121 This view may
be accurate for the President’s power over the National Guard in
the fifty states but not for D.C. In the nation’s political heart,
Alexander Hamilton’s “vigorous executive” must exist in full to
protect against foreign attacks, administer laws, protect property
against groups that attempt to interrupt the national government,
and secure liberty against factions and anarchy.122 Thousands of
angry citizens attacking the Capitol certainly falls within Mr.
Hamilton’s examples.
The Supreme Court explored executive power within the context
of presidential action during military conflict in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer.123 During the Korean Crisis,124 a nation-wide work
stoppage at the country’s steel mills jeopardized the production of
much-needed armaments for the war effort.125 In response, President
Truman issued Executive Order 10340, directing the Secretary of
Commerce to seize the mills.126 The question before the Court was
117. Id. at 703.
118. See Richard A. Epstein, Executive Power, the Commander in Chief, and the Militia
Clause, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 317, 319 (2005).
119. See, e.g., id. at 706–07; Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power
Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 646 (2004) (“[T]he [Foreign Affairs]
Act’s specific and modest language suggests that its basis was understood to be the
Constitution’s discrete grants, functionally applied, rather than an unstated consensus
viewing foreign affairs as an inherently executive matter.”).
120. Epstein, supra note 118, at 320–21.
121. Id. at 323.
122. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
123. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
124. The conflict in Korea was not technically a war because Congress never formally
declared one. See Charles A. Stevenson, The Korea War Powers Precedent, LAWFARE (July 23,
2020, 10:52 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/korea-war-powers-precedent.
125. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582.
126. Id. at 583.
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whether the President’s order was constitutional.127 While the Court
ultimately declined to sustain the seizure order,128 Justice Jackson
discussed the executive power as that “from the reign of ancient kings
to the rule of modern dictators[,]” which marked the executive’s
speed.129 Concurring, Justice Frankfurter surveyed the historical
practice of the power, considering the “systematic, unbroken,
executive practice . . . engaged in by Presidents . . . making as it were
such exercise of power part of the structure of our government . . . as
a gloss on ‘executive Power[.]’”130
The Supreme Court for the District of Columbia also analyzed
the executive power for military decisions. Ruling on Lincoln’s
suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War, the court
“regarded every possible vigorous and legal exercise of executive
power for the suppression of the existing rebellion, not only as the
legal right, but the solemn and sworn duty of the President.”131 And
in an 1863 treatise, Judge Daniel Agnew lauded the President’s
constitutional power when the rule of law was obstructed or

127. Id. at 584.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 629 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson offered the hierarchy of
Presidential power when compared to Congress’s actions. See id. at 636–38 (discussing the
three tiers).
130. Id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Kristen E. Eichensehr, The
Youngstown Canon: Vetoed Bills and the Separation of Powers, 70 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1281 (2021)
(remarking that “[h]istorical gloss can be relevant to any of Jackson’s three Youngstown
categories”); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (discussing historical
gloss in the foreign relations sphere).
131. In re Dugan, 6 D.C. 131, 148 (1865). Though many of Lincoln’s actions during the
War Between the States raised difficult questions about the scope of presidential power, few
criticize Lincoln’s actions during a crisis. See, e.g., Daniel W. Hamilton, Popular
Constitutionalism in the Civil War: A Trial Run, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 953, 958 (2006) (recalling
Chief Justice Taney’s belief that “much of the Lincoln administration’s war policy was
unconstitutional”). In fact, most share the Hon. Daniel Agnew’s view of Lincoln:
O, how grand is the spectacle of an upright man breasting the pitiless storm of
misfortune, injustice, and passion, in the discharge of high and holy duty! The fate
of a great nation hangs suspended on his arm; and with his face turned upward
toward heaven, as if to scrutinize the decrees of the Providence above, he stands,
nobly determined to sustain and lift it above all human effort to destroy. Millions
look to him for safety, and he feels the awful weight of responsibility crushing him
almost to earth. But, with faith unmoved, hope, renewed, “springs eternal in his
breast,” and he marches onward to the goal of duty[.]
DANIEL AGNEW, OUR NATIONAL CONSTITUTION: ITS ADAPTATION TO A STATE OF WAR OR
INSURRECTION 38 (1863).
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when the normal civil process was unable to suppress unrest.132
He remarked that the President has unquestioned power to
suppress insurrections given his titles as Commander in Chief and
Chief Executive.133
2. Executive orders
The President relies on executive orders to act in the absence of
congressional legislation.134 Promulgated on October 1, 1969,
Executive Order 11485 references the President’s authority as
commander in chief of the Armed Forces and the DCNG.135 The
President can delegate authority to the Secretary of Defense who
then may delegate to the Commanding General of the DCNG, to
“supervise, administer and control the Army National Guard and
the Air National Guard of the District of Columbia . . . while in
militia status.”136 Through the President, the Secretary “may [also]
order out the National Guard . . . to aid the civil authorities of the
District.”137 Neither the Insurrection Act nor D.C. Code section
49-409 directly authorizes the President to aid D.C. civil authorities,
or, in the alternative, denies him the power. The Executive Order is
important because it cements the President’s authority over the
132. AGNEW, supra note 131, at 14 (“[W]hen the laws are obstructed or opposed by
combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary civil process.”).
133. Id. at 14–15 (“[T]he President, who is the constitutional head of the army, navy,
and militia, and who is constitutionally enjoined by oath to preserve, protect, and defend the
Constitution, and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; is commanded to use the
whole military power of the United States to suppress such combination, and cause the laws
to be duly executed; and that he is the sole and exclusive judge of the facts calling the exercise
of this power into requisition.”).
134. The executive branch has issued 14,022 Executive Orders and 1,079 since 1994. See
Executive
Orders,
FED.
REG.,
https://www.federalregister.gov/presidential-documents/executive-orders (last visited
Apr. 8, 2021). President Biden has issued thirty-eight executive orders as of April 7. Id. As
one former President quipped, “I am also going to act on my own if Congress is
deadlocked . . . I’ve got a pen to take executive actions where Congress won’t[.]” Tamara
Keith, Wielding a Pen and a Phone, Obama Goes It Alone, NPR (Jan. 20, 2014, 3:36 AM),
http://n.pr/3bbPEZO. President Obama also announced that “[w]e can’t wait for an increasingly
dysfunctional Congress to do its job . . . [w]here they won’t act, I will.” F.H. Buckley, The Fall and
Rise of Crown Government, 68 DRAKE L. REV. 247, 260 (2020) (citations omitted).
135. Exec. Order No. 11485, 34 Fed. Reg. 15,411 (Oct. 1, 1969); Executive Orders, NAT’L
ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/11485.html
(last visited Aug. 20, 2021).
136. Id.
137. Id.; see also MICHAEL A. FOSTER, LAWRENCE KAPP & ALAN OTT, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
IF11768, NATIONAL GUARD CIVIL SUPPORT IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 1–3 (2021).
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DCNG when Congress has not directly spoken on the matter and
the President is acting in accordance with his independent,
constitutional powers.138
Absent congressional action to the contrary, the President has
constitutional power as commander in chief, chief executive, and,
by virtue of Executive Order 11485, the authority to control D.C.’s
military force. Protecting the nation’s capital requires speed,
decisiveness, and unity of command. Congress’s natural
inefficiencies confirm that the President should retain military
power, which is why the Constitution places control of the military
in Article II.139
B. Congress
The Constitution grants Congress significant powers in Article
I that includes limited control over military affairs. In addition to
the President’s role, Congress guides the DCNG through
traditional military legislation like the Insurrection Act as well as
relevant D.C. law.
1. Article I powers
Congress’s role differs from the Executive respecting the
military. The President is aptly named Commander in Chief
because he commands the armed forces.140 Yet the Constitution
gives Congress control over some aspects of the military such as the
spending power and the Calling-Forth Clause.141 Further, Congress
controls the purse strings and can pass laws regulating the military.

138. In other words, the President is operating in Justice Jackson’s second tier, the
“absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority” and so the President “can
only rely upon his own independent powers[.]” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
139. Congress is not the right body to respond to emergencies. They “cannot foresee
the infinite variety of circumstances attending war, and therefore legislate[] most effectively
in vesting the President the whole power of the Government, and leaving him to act upon
the circumstances.” AGNEW, supra note 131, at 15.
140. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
141. Anti-Federalists worried that a federal army would “trample on [the] fallen
liberty[.]” PATRICK HENRY, SPEECH AT THE VIRGINIA RATIFYING CONVENTION (June 5, 1788),
reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES
202 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986). They wondered, “[h]ave we the means of resisting disciplined
armies, when our only defence, the militia is put into the hands of Congress?” Id. Ultimately,
the Federalists won the debate and Congress retained enumerated power over the militia.
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Finally, Congress has exclusive jurisdiction over D.C. laws to
include the DCNG.
First, Congress may enact laws relating to the National
Guard.142 For example, while militias were originally state
institutions,143 Congress put them under federal control during
mobilization for WWI.144 A dual enlistment requirement was also
created so that members of the National Guard played two
complementary roles: National Guard for the states and the
National Guard used for federal missions.145 Additionally,
Congress holds the power “[t]o provide for organizing, arming,
and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them
as may be employed in the Service of the United States[.]”146
Congress can also call up the militia to enforce laws, suppress
insurrections, and defend against invasions.147 And congressional
laws like the Insurrection Act specify when the President can
activate the National Guard.148
Second, and perhaps the most significant authority, is
Congress’s power of the purse.149 To harness the taxing and
spending clauses for military affairs, Article I directs Congress “[t]o

142. See Frederick Bernays Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARV. L.
REV. 181, 187–88, 193–99 (1940) (discussing the Militia Act of 1792, the Militia Act of 1795, the
National Defense Act of 1916, and the Dick Act); Richard Hartzman, Congressional Control of
the Military in a Multilateral Context: A Constitutional Analysis of Congress’s Power to Restrict the
President’s Authority to Place United States Armed Forces Under Foreign Commanders in United
Nations Peace Operations, 162 MIL. L. REV. 50, 84 (1999) (“Madison’s notes from the
Constitutional Convention contain the following brief entry: ‘Mr. Gerry. “To make rules for
the Government and regulation of the land & naval forces,”—added from the existing
Articles of Confederation.’”) (citation omitted).
143. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 178 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (“If it should be a slight commotion in a small part of a State, the militia of the
residue would be adequate to its suppression . . . .”); Wiener, supra note 142, at 184–85.
(“[T]he militia was not abolished. It was to be available for federal service in . . . specified
contingencies[,] . . . organized, armed and disciplined by Congress, [and], except when in
federal service, was to be governed by the States.”) (citations omitted).
144. CTR. FOR L. & MIL. OPERATIONS, DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL LAW 2018 HANDBOOK
FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES 49 (2018); National Defense Act, Chapter 134, 64 Congress, 39 Stat.
166 (1916).
145. CTR. FOR L. & MIL. OPERATIONS, supra note 144, at 49.
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
148. 10 U.S.C. § 251–55 (2016) (the Insurrection Act).
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“[T]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”).
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raise and support Armies” and “provide and maintain a Navy[.]”150
The President may be the commander in chief, but troops cannot
go far without appropriations.151 With considerable assistance from
the federal government, states fund their own National Guard.152
Congress funds the Guard’s activities under Title 32 status when
the National Guard executes federal missions under state control or
Title 10 status when the President activates the Guard for federal
service.153 For D.C., the federal government funded 63% of the
DCNG through federal payments and grants in 2016.154 Should
D.C. become a state, however, D.C. would likely have to increase
local funds by about $8 million155 unless the DCNG were to be
activated under Title 10 or 32 status for an enduring mission.156
Finally, Congress legislates exclusively for D.C.157 As James
Madison argued in Federalist No. 43, a national government must
have complete authority over its seat of government which
includes control over legislation.158 Otherwise, there might be

150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12–13.
151. See Joseph Dragovich, George Washington’s Money War, MEDIUM (Nov. 25, 2019),
https://medium.com/lessons-from-history/george-washingtons-money-war-c1cb55cd3fdf
(“More frightening than the shot of the British: the enemy was hyperinflation. Ironically, the man
who would eventually be the face of the one-dollar bill spent a lot of time worrying about the
value of the Continental dollar, and how its collapse endangered the American Revolution.”).
152. See, e.g., FY 2020 State Budget Request, UTAH NAT’L GUARD,
https://le.utah.gov/interim/2019/pdf/00002001.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2021).
153. Reference Sheet on the Insurrection Act and Related Authorities, BROOKINGS INST.,
https://brook.gs/3rjF1d8 (last visited Apr. 8, 2021).
154. See Office of the Chief Financial Officer, FY 2016 Proposed Budget and
Financial
Plan,
DC.gov,
https://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/fk_dcng_c
hapter_2016j.pdf, at C-56 (last visited Sept. 21, 2021) (“The budget is comprised of $5,026,262
in Local funds, $435,000 in Federal Payments, and $7,855,383 in Federal Grant funds.”).
155. Id. (federal payments and grants totaled $8,290,383 in 2016).
156. Title 32 status means that a National Guard is being used for federal purposes, but
control remains with the governor. See Dwight Stirling & Corey Lovato, With All Due Respect,
Mr. President, We’re Not Going to Follow That Order: How and Why States Decide Which Federal
Military Rules Apply to State National Guard Personnel, 22 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 95, 108 (2017).
157. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. (“To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever, over such District . . . as may . . . become the Seat of the Government of the
United States.”).
158. Mr. Madison argued that “[t]he indispensable necessity of complete authority at
the seat of government carries its own evidence with it.” CASEY, supra note 92 (quoting THE
FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 272 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
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undue influence exerted from the national government on the local
government, or vice versa.159
The President retains command over the military as
commander in chief and chief executive. Congress, however, has
significant powers under Article I to regulate the military, control
funding, and legislate for D.C. In sum, both branches affect the
DCNG’s operation.
2. The Insurrection Act
The Insurrection Act is the primary law pertaining to
presidential power over state militia.160 If Congress calls forth the
militia, command of that body rests with the commander in chief.161
The Framers created this shared power model to promote checks
and balances and prevent a President from invoking martial
law capriciously.162
Continuing in the tradition of the Militia Acts of 1792 and
1795,163 the Insurrection Act allows the President to use federal
159. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 272 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“[D]ependence of the members of the general government on the State . . . might bring on
the national councils an imputation of awe or influence.”) The “drain the swamp” refrain
oft-quoted by President Trump is not new. See Ted Widmer, Draining the Swamp, NEW
YORKER (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/draining-theswamp (writing that President Reagan and others used the phrase). Also, during the
Constitution’s ratification debates, the “Anti-Federalists persisted in visualizing [D.C.] as a
sink of corruption and a potential nursery for tyrants.” CASEY, supra note 92.
160. Insurrection Act, Chapter 41, 9 Congress, Public Law 9-41. 2 Stat. 443 (1807). See
Kelly Magsamen, 4 Ways Congress Can Amend the Insurrection Act, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(June 12, 2020, 4:00 AM), http://ampr.gs/2Pt5gzz.
161. See Thaddeus Hoffmeister, An Insurrection Act for the Twenty-First Century, 39
STETSON L. REV. 861, 874 (2010) (reproducing the 1792 Calling Forth Act which authorized
the president to call forth and issue orders to the militia).
162. Id. at 875.
163. Congress first passed the Militia Act of 1792, which specified that “whenever the
United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent danger of invasion . . . and in case of an
insurrection in any state, against the government thereof, it shall be lawful for the
President . . . to call forth . . . militia . . . to suppress such insurrection.” Militia Act of 1792,
Ch. 28, 2 Congress, Public Law 2-28. 1 Stat. 264 (1792). But the President could not unilaterally
federalize the state militia. He must wait “on application of the legislature of such state, or
of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened).” Id. Thus, “[i]t’s provisions were
unworkable” because the first step to calling for the militia required judicial notifications
through a federal district court, a Supreme Court justice, or a U.S. marshal. Wiener, supra
note 142, at 187; Militia Act of 1792. Finally, the commander in chief must first “command
such insurgents to disperse” before “us[ing] the military force.” Militia Act of 1792. The
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forces and the militia to enforce laws.164 Today, the Act exists in
Title 10 of the U.S. Code.165 It affirms the President’s power to
mobilize the National Guard in the spirit of the original Militia
Acts.166 The President may use the Guard to respond to various
crises. He can mobilize state forces “[w]henever [he] considers that
unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion
against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to
enforce the laws[.]”167 There does not have to be an actual
insurrection. Even an unlawful obstruction like a labor dispute168 or
riot169 may be enough to trigger executive authority.
President invoked the Act one time. See Wiener, supra note 142, at 187–88 (suppressing the
1794 Whiskey Rebellion). In 1795, Congress amended the Militia Act to remove the provision
requiring notification of a federal judiciary official before Presidential action. See Militia Act
of 1795, Chapter 36, 3 Congress, Public Law 3-36. 1 Stat. 424 (1795). So the President now
judged when a situation merited calling forth the militia. See F.E. Guerra-Pujol, Domestic
Constitutional Violence, 41 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 211, 223 (2019) (“Under the new law,
the President had the unilateral power to decide how serious or severe an obstruction was.”).
164. Insurrection Act, Ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443 (1807); Hoffmeister, supra note 161, at 882–83.
165. 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–55.
166. Id. § 251 (“Whenever there is an insurrection in any State against its government,
the President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor if the legislature
cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia . . . as he considers necessary
to suppress the insurrection.”).
167. Id. § 252; Cf. Militia Act of 1792, Ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (1792) (“[I]t shall be lawful for
the President . . . on the application of the legislature of such state, or of the executive . . . to
call forth such number of the militia of any other state . . . as he may judge sufficient to
suppress such insurrection.”).
168. See H ARLAN D. UNRAU, H ISTORIC R ESOURCE STUDY: C HESAPEAKE & OHIO
CANAL 130–32 (2007), https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/choh/unrau_hrs.pdf
(describing President Jackson’s mobilization of U.S. Cavalry to “preserve the peace” at the
C&O Canal); Jonathan Bassett, The Pullman Strike of 1894, 11 LAB. HIST. 34, 34 (1997) (showing
that President Cleveland ordered federal troops to enforce an injunction against striking
Pullman workers); Randall McGuire, Colorado Coalfield Massacre, 57 ARCHAEOLOGY 62, 62
(2004) (recounting the deployment of the Colorado National Guard to attack striking
miners); see also Tung Yin, Coercion and Terrorism Prosecutions in the Shadow of Military
Detention, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1255, 1328 (explaining why the Court in Moyer v. Peabody, 212
U.S. 78, 84 (1909), justified a governor’s deployment of the National Guard’s because the
strikers were “stand[ing] in the way of restoring peace”).
169. See Michael Jackman, Forgotten History: Detroit’s 1943 Race Riot Broke Out 75 Years
Ago
Today,
DETROIT
METRO
TIMES
(June
20,
2018,
8:49
AM),
https://www.metrotimes.com/news-hits/archives/2018/06/20/forgotten-historydetroits-1943-race-riot-broke-out-75-years-ago-today; Michael Yockel, 100 Years: The Riots of
1968,
BALTIMORE
(May
2007),
https://www.baltimoremagazine.com/section/community/100-years-the-riots-of-1968/;
cf. Anjuli Sastry & Karen Grigsby Bates, When LA Erupted in Anger: A Look Back at the Rodney
King Riots, NPR (Apr. 26, 2017, 1:21 PM), http://n.pr/3c5cx0f (marking a governor’s
mobilization of National Guard to quell a riot).
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Yet Congress does not give the President unfettered power.
Granted, under the Insurrection Act’s authority, the President may
suppress insurrections, domestic violence, or conspiracies.170 But an
incident must fall under one of two broad categories. First, the
disorder must prevent a state from executing its laws to the extent
that people are deprived a “right, privilege, immunity, or
protection[,]” and the state government is unable to protect the
peoples’ rights.171 Second, the commander in chief may order out
the Guard if the unrest obstructs or impedes federal law.172 So given
these limitations, the Insurrection Act buttresses Congress’s intent
that the President should be able to deploy federal forces within
states “only in the gravest of circumstances[.]”173
Still, some argue that Congress never had the authority to pass
the Insurrection Act.174 Critics complain that the Insurrection Act
“has exceeded constitutional boundaries erected to protect state
decision-making prerogatives[.]”175 In short, they are concerned
that the act gives too much power to the President.176 Yet, as
Professor Thaddeus Hoffmeister points out, the President’s
domestic use of troops flows from Congress’s delegation of
constitutional power.177 Thus, the Insurrection Act allows the
170. 10 U.S.C. § 253.
171. Id. § 253(1).
172. Id. § 253(2).
173. William C. Banks, Providing “Supplemental Security”—The Insurrection Act and the
Military Role in Responding to Domestic Crises, 3 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 39, 45 (2009). Banks
also discusses how Congress passed a 2006 amendment to the Insurrection Act, following
Hurricane Katrina, that “unconstitutionally permitted the President to bypass state
decisionmakers and extended federal authority beyond what the Article IV Protection
Clause and Article I Calling Forth Clauses permit.” Id. at 44. Congress, recognizing its error,
repealed the amendment less than two years later. Id.
174. Hoffmeister, supra note 161, at 883–84 (“According to Professor Engdahl, who has
written extensively on domestic military use, using ‘regular troops was not pursuant to the
letter of the Constitution, which at most contemplated only militia for this role.’ This view
was shared by President Millard Fillmore. President Fillmore also noted that the law could
not apply to federal troops because it conflicted with the President’s constitutional duties as
Commander-in-Chief.”) (citations omitted).
175. Banks, supra note 173, at 45.
176. See id. at 81 (“[P]ermit[ting] uninvited federal military action in the event of
domestic violence ignores unambiguous constitutional text, and it flies in the face of the
original understanding of the Protection Clause.”).
177. Hoffmeister, supra note 161, at 883–84 (“[S]upport for its constitutionality can be
found in several places. First, looking beyond Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 and examining
Congress’ War Powers in their entirety under Article I, Section 8, there is a strong argument
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Executive necessary power, under congressional limitations, to
protect the nation during emergencies.
3. D.C. statutes
Because of D.C.’s unique status, the mayor does not command
the National Guard. Instead, D.C. law, affirmed by Congress,
directs the President as commander in chief of the DCNG. Laws for
D.C. must pass through Congress because D.C. does not have an
actual legislative body.178 Thus, Congress could have put the mayor
in command. Instead of doing so, Congress allowed D.C. to name
the President as the DCNG’s commander in chief through D.C.
Code § 49-409.179 This act was logical because of the DCNG’s
national character. Section 49-404 states that “The enrolled militia
shall not be subject to any duty except when called into the service
of the United States, or to aid the civil authorities in the execution
of the laws or suppression of riots.”180 As explained in section I.C,
D.C. is unique as the national capital. Any riot or disturbance that
would prohibit the execution of laws would affect the nation. And
so the nation’s commander in chief should naturally control D.C.’s
military force.
C. Shared Power
By design, the Constitution and federal law create points of
overlap and conflict between the President and Congress
respecting control of the DCNG. As Commander in Chief, the
that Congress did have authority to pass the Insurrection Act of 1807. Second, the opinion
by Secretary of State Madison is simply his opinion, not binding law. Third and probably
most persuasive, when deploying troops domestically, Presidents from Washington to Bush
have mostly adhered to the Insurrection Act’s requirements.”) (citations omitted).
178. Granted, D.C. residents did secure the presidential vote with the Twenty-Third
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII. In a compromise, however, Congress enacted the
District of Columbia Home Rule Act. D.C. CODE § 1-201 (2021). So Congress delegated
legislative powers to the District but retained an ultimate legislative veto. § 1-201.102
(“[A]uthorize the election of certain local officials by the registered qualified electors in the
District of Columbia; grant to the inhabitants of the District of Columbia powers of local selfgovernment; modernize, reorganize, and otherwise improve the governmental structure of
the District of Columbia; and, to the greatest extent possible, consistent with the
constitutional mandate, relieve Congress of the burden of legislating upon essentially local
District matters.”).
179. D.C. CODE § 49-409 (2021) (“The President of the United States shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of the militia of the District of Columbia.”).
180. Id. § 49–404.
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President can order the DCNG when called into federal service. But
Congress has express power over D.C. legislation and equipping
and funding the military.
Though it appears that a local executive should direct many of
the DCNG’s roles,181 the D.C. Mayor cannot mobilize the DCNG—
she can only request forces.182 The job of mobilization rests with the
President. Thus, in a January 6 scenario—when there is a direct
threat to the national government—the President and his
authorized deputies are the only ones who can deploy the DCNG.183
Because the Constitution and congressional statutes give the
weight of D.C. military control to the President, there is a danger of
a rogue commander in chief issuing unconstitutional orders.
Despite the risk, the President should control the DCNG because
the President has ability to make rapid, centralized decisions using
the full weight of the Executive branch. Discussed in Part III,
another solution to minimize the risk would be to allow D.C.’s
executive—whether it be mayor or governor—to control the DCNG
in whole or in part.
III. D.C.’S EXECUTIVE AS COMMANDER OF THE DCNG
D.C.’s executive could theoretically command the DCNG or
share command with the President. However, allowing the mayor
or governor of D.C. to control the DCNG would create a conflict of
interest and disrupt the political status quo. For example, should
the President mobilize the DCNG and order it to prevent Congress
from meeting, that order would be unconstitutional. But imagine a
scenario where Congress meets to certify an election and actionable
intelligence points to pending violence. Further, the Mayor,
Congress, and administration officials recommend the DCNG’s
deployment, yet the President refuses. To preempt this scenario,
181. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
182. Ashraf Khalil & Lolita C. Baldor, DC Mayor Calls in National Guard Ahead of ProTrump Protests, AP NEWS (Jan. 4, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-donaldtrump-politics-electoral-college-muriel-bowser-1634bf71a27de48efef3cd1e6ed4abe4
(“Because D.C. does not have a governor, the designated commander of the city’s National
Guard is Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy. Any D.C. requests for Guard deployments have
to be approved by him.”).
183. See id.; Alex Marquardt, Barbara Starr, Alison Main & Devan Cole, Pentagon
Approves DC Mayor’s Request to Deploy National Guard for Upcoming Demonstrations, CNN
POLITICS (Jan. 4, 2021, 8:52 PM), http://cnn.it/38mYHFc (reporting how the acting Secretary
of Defense approved the D.C. Mayor’s request).
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Congress could give the Mayor control over the DCNG, or through
legislation, make D.C. the fifty-first state and put the Guard under
the Governor’s control. But those options would likely create more
conflict, even under a power-sharing arrangement.
The D.C. Mayor could command the DCNG apart from
homeland defense activities. For years, D.C.’s representative has
petitioned this very fact. Rep. Norton reintroduced the District of
Columbia National Guard Home Rule Act in February 2021,184 and
the proposal gained support from numerous civil society groups.185
The Act purports to give D.C.’s mayor the same authorities over
the National Guard as state governors. 186 Or D.C. could become
a state, and the State of Washington, Douglass Commonwealth’s187
governor would then control the Guard.188 Existing D.C. laws would
184. District of Columbia National Guard Home Rule Act, H.R. 657, 117th Cong. (2021).
See Press Release, House Comm. Oversight & Reform, Norton, Maloney, Van Hollen, Carper
Say D.C. Mayor Must be Given Control over D.C. Nat’l Guard and President Must be
Stripped
of
Auth.
over
D.C.
Police
Dep’t
(Jan.
8,
2021),
https://oversight.house.gov/news/press-releases/norton-maloney-van-hollen-carper-sa
y-dc-mayor-must-be-given-control-over-dc (“Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton (DDC), Rep. Carolyn B. Maloney (D-NY), Chairwoman of the Committee on Oversight and
Reform, Senator Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), and Senator Tom Carper (D-DE) said that
Wednesday’s attack on the U.S. Capitol demonstrated once again that local public safety in
the District of Columbia (D.C.) is subject to the whim of the President and that it is past time
for Congress, pending D.C. statehood, to pass legislation to give the District’s mayor control
over the D.C. National Guard and to repeal the President’s authority to federalize the D.C.
police department.”).
185. See, e.g., Coalition Letter Urges Congress to Support D.C. National Guard Home Rule
Act,
BRENNAN
CTR.
FOR
JUST.
(Apr.
29,
2021),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/coalition-letter-urgescongress-support-dc-national-guard-home-rule-act.
186. District of Columbia National Guard Home Rule Act, S. 130, 117th Cong. (2021)
(“[E]xtend to the Mayor of the District of Columbia the same authority . . . as the Governors
of the several States . . . with respect to administration of the National Guard and its use to
respond to natural disasters and other civil disturbances.”).
187. “State of Washington, Douglass Commonwealth” is but one potential name for the
fifty-first state. H.R. 51, 116th Cong. § 101(a) (2020) (“the State of Washington, Douglass
Commonwealth is declared to be a State of the United States of America[.]”). Other options
include “New Columbia,” “Douglass,” or “Douglass Commonwealth.” What’s the 51st State,
DC STATEHOOD COAL., http://www.dcstatehoodcoalition.org/what-s-the-51st-state/ (last
visited Apr. 8, 2021).
188. The House passed the latest statehood bill introduced by Rep. Norton on April 22,
2021. Washington, D.C. Admission Act, supra note 10. The Senate recently held hearings on
June 22, 2021 for the House bill’s counterpart. See Examining D.C. Statehood: Hearing on S. 51
Before the S. Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affs. Comm., 117th Cong. (2021) (statement of Sen.
Rob Portman). https://bit.ly/2YKinRs. The bill purports to convert the current District into
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apply, and the DCNG would become the Capital National Guard
under the command of the governor.189
However, giving the D.C. executive even partial control over
a critical military force in the national capital invites conflict of
interest. Respecting presidential power, the Constitution names
the President as commander in chief, grants him the executive
power, and charges him with defending the Constitution against
enemies foreign and domestic. Rome experimented with dual
executives after it discarded monarchy.190 But when Gaius Octavius
proclaimed himself emperor in 27 BCE,191 and initiated an imperial
dynasty, the consuls’ power faded.192 Of course, the President is not
a Roman emperor.193 The Framers did, however, want the President
in some measure to have powers akin to the king in military
affairs.194 And unitary presidential power is even more necessary
for protecting the country’s political heart.
That is not to deny that two persons influencing the D.C.
military—the President and the mayor or governor of D.C.—could
a state by holding initial elections for two senators and one representative. Washington, D.C.
Admission Act, H.R. 51, 117th Cong. (2021). This was not Rep. Norton’s first attempt. Owing
partly to the incident at Lafayette Square, where National Guard, Park Police, and Secret
Service allegedly used excessive force to clear protestors in advance of President Trump’s
visit, see Catie Edmondson, National Guard Officer Says Police Used ‘Excessive’ Force at White
House Clash, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2020), https://nyti.ms/3mVBMHU, the House passed a
previous version in June 2020. Roll Call 122: Bill Number: H.R. 51, CLERK U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES (June 26, 2020, 2:41 PM), https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2020122.
189. H.R. 657; S. 130.
190. See
generally
BRITANNICA,
CONSUL
(1998),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/consul-ancient-Roman-official (last visited Oct. 13,
2021).
191. MICHAEL
GRANT,
BRITANNICA,
AUGUSTUS
(Aug.
15,
2021),
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Augustus-Roman-emperor.
192. Oliver Fletcher, What Was the Role of Consul in the Roman Republic?, HISTORY HIT (Nov.
23, 2018), https://www.historyhit.com/what-was-the-role-of-consul-in-the-roman-republic/
(“While Rome’s emperors did not abolish the office of consul it became a largely ceremonial post,
increasingly vulnerable to corruption and misuse.”).
193. But cf. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., “A Republic if [We] can Keep It”: A Prolegomenon
on Righting the Ship of State in the Wake of the Trumpian Tempest, 98 TEX. L. REV. 539, 549
(2020) (“It bears noting that Levinson and Balkin are hardly alone in criticizing the
creeping evolution of the office of the President into that of a Roman Emperor and
Congress’s abject failure to do anything meaningful to arrest, much less reverse, this
trend.”) (footnote omitted).
194. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 417 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(Unlike a king, the “President w[ould] have only the occasional command of such part of the
militia” whereas “[t]he king of Great Britain and the governor of New York have at all times
the entire command of all the militia within their several jurisdictions.”).
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not create checks and balances.195 But events like January 6 demand
swift action. Two bickering commanders may create a stalemate
like the one formed in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.196 After
Katrina ravaged New Orleans, President Bush considered invoking
the Insurrection Act.197 Yet he delayed because of the Louisiana
governor’s refusal to request federal military assistance.198
Meanwhile, civil unrest mounted. During crises, especially those
that might occur in D.C., the nation should have one commander.199
Granted, even should the D.C. Mayor or Governor command the
Guard, their authority would not extend to homeland defense
because federal statutes are supreme over local statutes.200 But the
line between extreme threats like insurrections and foreign
invasions, where the Insurrection Act clearly applies, and civil
unrest may not be evident. Thus, there is a danger in a Katrina-like
tug-of-war between the D.C. executive and the President.201

195. See Roman Consul, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_consul#
Abuse_prevention (last visited Apr. 8, 2021) (describing three checks for the two Roman consuls:
Roman consuls could veto each other, the consuls would take monthly turns administering,
and consuls wanted to have a political future).
196. See Michael Bahar, The Presidential Intervention Principle: The Domestic Use of the
Military and the Power of the Several States, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 537, 634 (2014) (“Tensions
between the presidency and the governors were high as the memory of Katrina festered.”);
Lisa Grow Sun, Disaster Mythology and the Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1131, 1158 (2011)
(describing the pressure for President Bush to invoke the Insurrection Act versus political
backlash should the feds deploy the National Guard over the state governor’s objections).
197. Sun, supra note 196, at 1158–59.
198. Id. at 1160 (“However, political considerations weighed against the Act’s
invocation. President Bush’s advisors feared the political repercussions of federalizing
National Guard troops over the objection of Louisiana Governor Blanco . . . .”)
199. For example, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
recommended a “dual hatted” approach to post-Katrina operations to achieve unity of
command. Id. Compare this response to U.S. operations in post-invasion Iraq 2003–04. See
Thomas
E.
Ricks,
General
Failure,
ATLANTIC
(Nov.
2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/11/general-failure/309148/ (“This
lack of any coherent strategy manifested itself in the radically different approaches taken by
different Army divisions in the war. Observers moving from one part of Iraq to another were
often struck by the extent to which each division was fighting its own war, with its own
assessment of the threat, its own solutions, and its own rules of engagement.”).
200. For example, see the proposed revision to D.C. Code § 49-404. D.C. CODE § 49-409
(2021); see also 32 U.S.C. §§ 901–08; 10 U.S.C. § 252. Examples of homeland defense activities
include deployments overseas in support of combat operations and flying combat air patrol.
Past and Post War, supra note 100.
201. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (“Roman history records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from the
dissensions between the Consuls, and between the military Tribunes . . . .”).
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Congress delegated to the President power to mobilize the
Guard under emergencies and named him DCNG’s commander in
chief. Having a single commander for the DCNG is essential to
protect our nation’s capital. Giving the D.C. Mayor or Governor
power would create a shared-power dynamic that would, as
Alexander Hamilton described, frustrate the national
government.202 For these reasons, Congress should not strip the
President of his authority over the DCNG.
IV. PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER OF THE DCNG
Instead of a situation where the local D.C. executive controls the
DCNG, the President should have de facto control of the DCNG
because that model follows the Constitution and preserves the
political status quo. Some post-January 6 critics, on the other hand,
strongly disagree.203 However, two variables temper the risk of a
rogue President: presidential delegation to senior-ranking military
and civilian defense officers and the military’s oath of office.204
A. The Constitutional and Political Choice
1. President as commander of the DCNG
The Constitution, federal statutes, and historical practice affirm
that the President, not Congress, should command the DCNG. To
begin, the Constitution empowers the President with the
commander-in-chief power.205 Some of the Framers relied on the
common understanding of the President’s role as a unitary
executive who can respond quickly to invasion and domestic

202. “[T]hey lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and
operation of those whom they divide[,] . . . they might impede or frustrate the most
important measures of the government, [and] . . . they might split the community into the
most violent and irreconcilable factions . . . .” Id.
203. See Press Release, supra note 184.
204. But see Philip Rucker, ‘A Rogue Presidency’: The Era of Containing Trump is Over,
CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 23, 2018, 4:25 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/nationworld/ct-trump-rogue-presidency-20181223-story.html (“Trump will enter his third year as
President [sic] unbound—at war with his perceived enemies, determined to follow through
on the hard-line promises of his insurgent campaign and fearful of any cleavage in his
political coalition.”).
205. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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violence.206 Mr. Hamilton felt that this clause was selfexplanatory.207 Thus, the President, not Congress or D.C.’s mayor,
should command D.C.’s military force. More, history208 and even
some of Hollywood’s exaggerated plots209 show why D.C. is a
prime target for bad actors. The Commander in Chief needs to be
able to call upon the National Guard at a moment’s notice to protect
the capital.
Even without the commander-in-chief power, the President
could rely on his executive power. While the Constitution does not
declare the President commander of D.C., the President operates in
Justice Jackson’s first tier—where “the President acts pursuant to
an express or implied authorization of Congress”—because the
Chief Executive follows Congress’s intent.210 Indeed, Congress has
named the President commander of the DCNG211 and given him
the power to mobilize the National Guard.212 Thus, in Justice
Jackson’s view, the President’s “authority is at its maximum[.]”213
Congress could try to reassert authority. Article I, Section 8
gives Congress the power for “organizing, arming, and
disciplining, the Militia . . . .”214 However, the clause does not
206. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (“Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly
demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand. The
direction of war implies the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing
and employing the common strength, forms a usual and essential part in the definition of
the executive authority.”).
207. Id. (“The propriety of this provision is so evident in itself, and it is, at the same
time, so consonant to the precedents of the State constitutions in general, that little need be
said to explain or enforce it.”).
208. See generally NCC Staff, On This Day, the British Set Fire to Washington, D.C., NAT’L
CONST. CTR. (Aug. 24, 2021), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/on-this-day-the-britishset-fire-to-washington-d-c (marking the 206th anniversary of the Bladensburg defeat and the
British raid on the capital).
209. See Bill Zwecker, Morgan Freeman Isn’t Pres, but He’s Next in Line, ROBERTEBERT.COM
(Mar. 20, 2013), https://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/olympus-has-fallen-2013 (reviewing the
2013 flick Olympus Has Fallen, about a North Korean terrorist plot to seize the White House and
kidnap the President).
210. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
211. D.C. CODE § 49-409 (2021).
212. Militia Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (1792); Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 425
(1795); Insurrection Act, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443 (1807); D.C. CODE § 49-409 (2021) (the militia, as
referenced in the early Acts, became the National Guard of modern times).
213. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
214. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
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include the authority to “command” or “control,” only to execute
administrative functions like equipping, appointing officers,
and “governing.”215 Likewise, the Constitution grants Congress
power to pass “exclusive Legislation in all Cases . . . over such
District . . . .”216 But none of these powers equal command. Like the
Army and Navy clauses,217 Congress provides while the
President commands.218
Additionally, Congress’s power of the purse is the ultimate
trump card. Yet, to effectively wield this power, Congress would
have to defund the DCNG219—an action that would be politically
unacceptable.220 As Professor Michael Paulsen correctly notes, this
is merely Congress’s “‘shoot-out’ power[.]”221 And the shoving
match could also inflame passions.222 That is why even Congress’s
displeasure over the President’s mobilization of the Guard at
Lafayette Square did not trigger calls to defund.223 The Guard is a
critical guarantor of D.C.’s security and national defense.224
215. Id. (listing Congress’s power in “governing such Part of them”).
216. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
217. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (“To raise and support Armies . . . .”); U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 13 (“To provide and maintain a Navy . . . .”); cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
218. The Framers intended it as such. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 320 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing how the separation of powers works at
“keeping each other in their proper places”).
219. See Robert F. Turner, War and the Forgotten Executive Power Clause of the Constitution:
A Review Essay of John Hart Ely’s War and Responsibility, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 903, 974 (1994)
(admitting that Congress does have “constitutional power to end U.S. military operations by
refusing to appropriate the necessary funding[,]” but recounting that Congress’s attempt to
defund Vietnam was also “unconstitutional[,]” as “Congress . . . usurp[ed] the discretion of
the Commander in Chief . . .”).
220. See Chris Cillizza, Is ‘Defund the Police’ a Massive Political Mistake?, CNN POLITICS
(June 8, 2020), http://cnn.it/3cVtESF (recounting that on the campaign trail, Biden refused to
support defunding the police). But see Noah Berlatsky, Defund the Police, Then Defund the
Military,
FOREIGN
POL’Y
(June
15,
2020,
12:13
PM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/15/defund-the-police-military-spending-militarizationblack-lives-matter/ (remarking that “[f]or Democrats, constraining military budgets in order to
invest in social services was once a mainstream position, not a fringe one”).
221. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The War Power, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 130 (2010).
222. Id. at 131 (“Congress may push but the President should push back.”).
223. See The U.S. Park Police Attack on Peaceful Protestors at Lafayette Square: Oversight
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Nat. Res., 116th Cong. (2020) (statement of Rep. Jared
Huffman) (mocking previous Republican efforts to “defund the police” in the context of
Bureau of Land Management enforcement).
224. See Erich B. Smith, D.C. Air Guard Unit Protects Skies Over Nation’s Capital, 113TH
WING
(Jan.
10,
2019),
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So Congress is not likely to use its appropriations power to curtail
the President’s control over the DCNG.
Constitutionally, the President has a sure foundation for his
command of the DCNG with the Commander in Chief and
Executive Clauses. Further, Congress has passed legislation
affirming the President’s power to call forth the National Guard to
suppress insurrections and it would be politically untenable for
Congress to use its spending power to reassert control. Thus, the
Chief Executive has the prerogative to command the DCNG.
2. Preserving the political status quo
One could plausibly claim that D.C. would be better served in
the event of another January 6 if the mayor commanded the
DCNG.225 After all, Mayor Bowser demanded National Guard
support hours before President Trump on January 6.226 Yet the
President must command the DCNG because the Constitution
envisions D.C. as politically neutral. Naming the Mayor
commander in chief would disrupt the status quo and lead to
unacceptable tension between the federal government and D.C.
There are practical reasons for leaving the President in charge. To
begin, D.C. is home to the nation’s political infrastructure. For frontline protection, the federal government relies on the Capitol Police227
and assorted federal officers.228 Yet these agencies lack the firepower

https://www.113wg.ang.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1728707/dc-air-guardunit-protects-skies-over-nations-capital/.
225. E.g., Elizabeth Goitein & Joseph Nunn, Why DC’s Mayor Should Have Authority Over the
DC
National
Guard,
BRENNAN
CTR.
FOR
JUST.
(Jan.
8,
2021),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/why-dcs-mayor-should-have-autho
rity-over-dc-national-guard.
226. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
227. Our Mission, U.S. CAPITOL POLICE, https://www.uscp.gov/the-department/ourmission (last visited Apr. 8, 2021); see also Arianne Cohen, Who Is in Charge of Capitol Building
Security
Anyway?
A
Primer,
FAST
CO.
(Jan.
6,
2021),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90591789/who-is-in-charge-of-capitol-building-securityanyway-a-primer (highlighting that a force of about 2,000 officers is “responsible for
protecting Congress and the public, and maintaining order while protecting the U.S.
Capitol”).
228. Covered Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, METRO. POLICE DEP’T,
https://mpdc.dc.gov/page/covered-federal-law-enforcement-agencies (last visited Apr. 8,
2021) (listing agencies like the ATF, FBI, ICE, U.S. Marshals Service, and U.S. Secret Service).
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and training of professional soldiers.229 Thus, the President needs a
responsive, well-equipped military force like the DCNG. If the
Mayor of D.C. controlled the Guard, the President might have
limited options should urgent need arise. He could ask the mayor for
permission to deploy the DCNG, but that would take time and the
mayor may not grant his request.230 Or the President could declare
an emergency and use the Guard as he would from any other state.231
Again, that would take precious time, and the President must have
tools immediately available to uphold his oath.232
To counter the loss of exclusive access to the Guard, the
President would most likely strengthen the existing forces under
his control.233 Yet that could create tension between the Chief
Executive and D.C.’s Mayor should D.C. host polarizing events.234
Such a scenario might present complications. For example, the
President might order executive agencies to stand down in advance
of a mass protest that was not coordinated with D.C. officials. Then,
as the crowd threatened federal buildings, the D.C. Mayor’s office
may frantically deploy the DCNG.

229. See Patrick Skinner, Our Training Didn’t Cover When to Shoot at a Mob Storming the
Capitol, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2021, 10:11 AM), http://wapo.st/2OUXnTF (writing that
“we were not trained in what to do if hundreds of people, egged on by the President of the
United States, decided to rush the building and disrupt certification of the votes of the
electoral college”).
230. See supra notes 196–200 and accompanying text.
231. See Mark Cancian, President Trump Has the Power to Call Out the Troops. He Shouldn’t
Use
It,
FORBES
(June
2,
2020,
7:38
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/markcancian/2020/06/02/the-president-has-the-powercall-out-the-troopsbut-shouldnt/?sh=82357df1793b (describing the President’s power to
federalize the National Guard to maintain order).
232. To “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.” U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
233. For example, some House members called for raising the Capitol Police’s budget
by twenty percent, which would “make it the biggest police force in the nation[.]” Nicole Fallert,
After Calls to Defund Police, Democrats Consider 20% Increase to Capitol Police Budget, Making It
Biggest
Force
in
the
U.S.,
NEWSWEEK
(Mar.
4,
2021,
2:33
PM),
https://www.newsweek.com/after-calls-defund-police-democrats-consider-20-increase-capitolpolice-budget-making-it-1573831.
234. If true, internal subversion within the DCNG would potentially complicate the issue.
See, e.g., Kevin Breuninger & Amanda Macias, Pentagon Probes Extremism in U.S. Military as
Thousands of Troops Guard D.C. After Capitol Riot, CNBC (Jan. 14, 2021, 8:22 PM),
http://cnb.cx/2NFjwow. In a worst-case scenario, a president might hand-pick Capitol Police
that are personally loyal to his extremist policies instead of officers loyal to the Constitution. Cf.
John Walcott, Trump or the Troops? Why 2 Top Military Leaders May Be Forced to Choose, TIME (June
26, 2020, 2:59 PM), https://time.com/5860398/esper-milley-trump-loyalty/.
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That is not to say that D.C.’s executive and the President could
not work out a power-sharing arrangement. For example, Congress
could grant the D.C. executive some semblance of power over the
DCNG. Specifically, it would allow the D.C. executive the power to
order the DCNG should the President fail to call out the National
Guard or orders the Guard to take unconstitutional action.235 In this
case, the mayor’s orders would not erase the Chief Executive’s
constitutional and statutory role as commander in chief. The mayor
would simply exercise power under a narrow exception. In effect,
the D.C. Mayor would act as if she were the President, responding
to a crisis in a given state.236 The President could reclaim authority
over the DCNG once the crisis passed.
However, there are three issues with this proposal. First, as
discussed in section I.C and Part III, the situation in D.C. is different
from that of the fifty states.237 Unlike the state governor/President
relationship, where the state is a sovereign body,238 D.C. was not
designed to be an independent polity.239 Second, the narrow
exception to the President’s control of the DCNG might expand to
the point that the mayor could deploy the DCNG at will.240 Third,
once the D.C. Mayor took control of the DCNG, it might be difficult
for the President to reassert command.241
235. For example, Mayor Bowser could have ordered the DCNG’s deployment on
January 6 to restore order.
236. Thus, the lesson learned from Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath—”certain
emergencies are so dire that they can transform what is ‘truly local’ into a matter of national
concern”—would apply, albeit reversed. Bahar, supra note 196, at 540 (citing United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000)). In the District of Columbia, certain crises could be so
extreme that they would change what is a national concern into a local matter.
237. See, e.g., id. (discussing how the Stafford Act lets the President “unilaterally
exercise any authority . . . when he or she determines an emergency exists[,]” but “this
section requires the President to consult the governor to determine whether such an
emergency exists”).
238. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“[B]ecause the States are
independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does
not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.”).
239. See supra notes 65–73 and accompanying text.
240. See United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[L]est the
exceptions swallow the rule.”).
241. For example, the National Guard deployment to D.C. for initially a short-term mission
turned into a five-month deployment. See Howard Altman, 26,000 National Guard Troops Came to
DC and Protected the Inauguration Without Incident. Now the Drawdown Begins, MILITARY TIMES (Jan.
21, 2021), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2021/01/21/26000-nationalguard-troops-came-to-dc-to-protectthe-inauguration-now-the-drawdown-begins/; Sarah Ferris,
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The District of Columbia is the nation’s capital. The Framers
intended D.C. to remain neutral, and the Constitution grants
Congress exclusive jurisdiction. Congress chose the President as
the DCNG commander and gave him unquestioned power to
declare emergencies and mobilize the Guard. Even allowing an
exception where the D.C. Mayor could deploy the DCNG in the
absence of presidential action, divesting the President of power would
lead to a political imbalance between the federal and local executive.
B. Safeguards
Even before January 6, some have suggested that more rigorous
checks should limit the commander in chief’s control of the
DCNG.242 Because the President can deploy the Guard, some worry
that a Chief Executive, subject to his “character and whims,” could
use the force for “undemocratic purposes.”243 President Trump
didn’t use the National Guard for undemocratic purposes on
January 6, but he did fail to take decisive action by not deploying the
Guard when Mayor Bowser and the Capitol Police requested
support.244 However, normally reliable safeguards exist in
presidential delegation to the military and the military’s oath of office.
1. Prior delegation
The President regularly delegates authority to senior military
officials. The practice is essential for the leader who commands
almost two million active duty and reserve forces.245 Delegation
comes in two forms. The President might delegate through standing
executive orders, or he might issue orders before a specific event. For
National Guard to Depart Capitol Nearly 5 Months After Jan. 6 Riot, POLITICO (May 24, 2021, 3:28 PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/05/24/national-guard-depart-capitol-riot-490580.
242. See Magsamen, supra note 160. These calls for change arose from outrage that
President Trump staged a so-called “photo-op” in front of St. John’s Church that required
law enforcement to use crowd control methods to disperse protestors. See, e.g., Katie Rogers,
Protestors Dispersed with Tear Gas So Trump Could Pose at Church, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2020),
http://nyti.ms/3byyJRf.
243. Magsamen, supra note 160.
244. See supra Section I.A.
245. There are 1,961,339 active duty and reserve Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps,
and Coast Guard; 443,589 Army and Air Force National Guard. Erin Duffin, Active and
Reserve U.S. Military Force Numbers, by Service Branch and Reserve Component 2019, STATISTA
(Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/232330/us-military-force-numbers-byservice-branch-and-reserve-component/.

750

751

Commander in Chief of the DCNG

example, before January 6, the Chief of Staff to the acting Secretary
of Defense reported that President Trump directed the acting
Secretary to “take any necessary steps” to support requests from
D.C. law enforcement to protect the Capitol and federal property.246
Delegation is important because it is not a best practice for a
commander in chief to dictate subordinates’ specific tactics.247
Instead, the commander should convey his intent and allow
subordinates freedom in carrying out those orders.248 However, the
President should interject himself into military operations if there
is a risk of strategic consequences, especially when “details might
determine the fate of the enterprise.”249
Prior delegation should have prevented or mitigated the
storming of the Capitol. The President had delegated authority to
federal agencies, allowing them to respond to an event like
January 6.250 More, Executive Order 12656 requires departments to
respond adequately to emergent crises.251 But by most accounts,

246. Haberman & Cooper, supra note 39 (emphasis added).
247. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER J. LAMB, THE MICROMANAGEMENT MYTH AND MISSION
COMMAND: MAKING THE CASE FOR OVERSIGHT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 32 (Thomas F. Lynch
III ed., 2020) (describing how mission command philosophy left U.S. Army brigades “free to
choose how they approached their campaign”).
248. See supra note 107 (describing commander’s intent). As Lamb posits, a president,
especially one without military experience, should leave the generals and admirals in charge
of military decisions during war and large-scale military operations. LAMB, supra note 247,
at 28.
249. LAMB, supra note 247, at 28.
250. Exec. Order No. 12656, 53 Fed. Reg. 47,493 (Nov. 18, 1988) (“The head of each
Federal department and agency, as appropriate, shall . . . [b]e prepared to respond
adequately to all national security emergencies . . . .”). Specifically, agencies “shall . . . [i]dentify
facilities . . . essential to the national defense and national welfare, and assess their
vulnerabilities and develop strategies, plans, and programs to provide for the security of such
facilities . . . .” Id. at 47,494.
251. Id. at 47,491 (“The policy of the United States is to have sufficient capabilities at all
levels of government to meet essential defense and civilian needs during any national
security emergency.”).
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agencies failed to meet the standard.252 In short, subordinate military
officials and agencies share blame for the ineffective response.253
Additionally, the President could have been more specific when
he delegated to his commanders. Arguably, he should have known
that an inflamed crowd might take literally his call to “stop the
steal,”254 and thus could have provided advance orders to the
National Guard. But micromanagement would have been atypical.
For most of his presidency, Trump offered broad intent and let the
military execute.255 Spontaneous tweets to his top generals, while
arguably legal orders,256 typically reinforced existing orders or gave
broad strategic guidance.257 As a result, when rioters breached the
Capitol, the acting Secretary of Defense or Secretary of the Army
should not have waited for direction from the President who was

252. See, e.g., Justine Coleman, Joint Chiefs Chairman: Military Response on Jan. 6 Was
‘Super
Fast’,
H ILL
(Mar.
3,
2021,
7:52
AM),
https://thehill.com/policy/defense/541343-joint-chiefs-chairman-military-response-onjan-6-was-super-fast (discussing how the Pentagon approved the DCNG’s deployment within
one hour and the Guard reacted in about three hours); Rachael Levy, Dan Frosch & Sadie
Gurman, Capitol Riot Warnings Weren’t Acted On as System Failed, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 8, 2021,
7:57 AM), http://on.wsj.com/3rvz4tA (“‘Nothing significant to report,’ read a Jan. 5 national
summary from DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis . . . .”); Rebecca Beitsch, Senate
Committees Probe 22 Agencies’ Response to Jan. 6 Attack, HILL (Feb. 8, 2021, 3:55 PM),
https://thehill.com/policy/defense/537864-senate-committees-probe-22-agencies-responseto-jan-6-attack (reporting how Senate committees demanded an accounting from twenty-two
federal agencies for their lackluster response to the insurrection on Jan. 6).
253. See, e.g., Alexa Corse & Lindsay Wise, Capitol Riot Probe by Senate Faults Intelligence,
Security Failures in Jan. 6 Breach, WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2021, 1:22 PM),
https://on.wsj.com/3AxNGxb (laying failures at the feet of Capitol security officials and
F.B.I. and D.H.S. agents).
254. Trump, supra note 3.
255. For example, President Trump deferred to the military when he called for withdrawal
from Syria. See W.J. Hennigan & Brian Bennett, Trump Doesn’t Micromanage the Military—But That
Could Backfire, L.A. TIMES (June 7, 2017, 3:00 AM), http://lat.ms/3quyivA. But see Matthew Dallek,
In the Weeds, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2019), http://wapo.st/3kWGpje (describing Trump as a severe
micromanager who used Twitter to announce a ban on transgender in the military); Dov S.
Zakheim, Being Commander in Chief Does Not Mean Micromanaging the Military, HILL (June 12, 2020,
11:30 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/502318-being-commander-in-chiefdoes-not-mean-micromanaging-the-military (quoting Trump’s tweets that Southern military
bases should keep their names).
256. See Butch Bracknell, Yes, The President’s Tweets Count as Legitimate Orders, No Matter How
Confusing
They
Seem,
TASK
&
PURPOSE
(Apr,
24,
2020,
4:46
AM),
https://taskandpurpose.com/opinion/trump-tweets-military-orders/.
257. See id. (discussing how President Trump reinforced standing Rules of Engagement,
considered a military transgender ban, and told the Navy to cease administrative
proceedings against a Navy SEAL).
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tweeting “USA demands the Truth!”258 Instead, the two military
leaders—who had the delegated authority to deploy the Guard on
behalf of the President—could have taken more responsive action in
the absence of Presidential direction. They eventually did so about
an hour after the breach.259 Delegation worked. And so the issue was
the delay, not that the D.C. Mayor lacked control of the DCNG.
2. The oath of office
The second check to prevent unconstitutional action is the
military’s oath of office.260 An officer owes allegiance to the
Constitution, not to any one person. So while some media feared
that Trump would exit office by launching a strike on Iran or
another country, possibly with nuclear weapons,261 General John E.
Hyten quickly explained that no military leader would obey an
illegal order.262 As he stated, “the U.S. military is trained to obey all
legal orders passed down the chain of command and to disobey
illegal ones, even if the President himself directs the illegal act.”263

258. Supra note 33.
259. Supra note 38 and accompanying text.
260. All military and civilian officers take the oath of office. See, e.g., Corey Kingsbury,
Mattis
Takes
Oath
of
Office,
YOUTUBE
(Jan.
21,
2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A4Ldq1PTFNw (showing James Mattis taking the
oath of office). In the oath, the officer swears or affirms that they will
support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and domestic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I
take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion;
and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am
about to enter. SO HELP ME GOD.
5 U.S.C. § 3331 (emphasis added).
261. See, e.g., David Schwartz & Steven Simon, The United States’ Nuclear Peril Will
Outlast This Administration, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 11, 2021, 4:46 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/
2021/01/11/nuclear-threat-trump-strike-distraction/ (“We need not presume the President
is unstable in order to find this an extremely unsettling possibility.”).
262. Rebecca Heinrichs, Trump, National Command Authority and Lawful Orders,
REALCLEAR
DEF.
(Nov.
27,
2017),
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/11/27/trump_national_command_author
ity_and_lawful_orders_112688.html (“The way the process works is it’s simple: I provide
advice to the President, he’ll tell me what to do and if it’s illegal, guess what’s going to
happen? . . . I’m going to say, ‘Mr. President that’s illegal.’” (quoting General Hyten,
Commander, USSTRATCOM)).
263. Id.
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The tragedy of My Lai informs how the military provides
training to its soldiers on their constitutional responsibilities.264 On
March 16, 1968, an Army unit, which had suffered dozens of
casualties from Viet Cong guerilla attacks, was sent to a
Vietnamese hamlet to fight the Viet Cong.265 Based on inaccurate
intelligence, the unit had been given orders to shoot at anything
moving and to destroy all buildings and crops.266 After four hours,
soldiers had killed approximately 500 civilians. 267 Military
members are taught this massacre as a cautionary tale: do not
forget your oath to the Constitution. That is not to deny that
members of the military are taught to obey tactical orders in battle
unflinchingly.268 They are.269 But those orders must be lawful, and
that is why there are roughly 4,600 judge advocates who instruct
officers and enlisted personnel that their oath to the Constitution
may override orders.270 Indeed, military leaders receive extensive
legal training on their obligations. 271

264. See, e.g., Marco Valenzuela, The Difference Between Oath of Office, Oath of Enlistment,
MARINE
CORPS
BASE
QUANTICO
(July
30,
2015),
https://www.quantico.marines.mil/news/news-article-display/article/611510/thedifference-between-oath-of-office-oath-of-enlistment/.
265. Michael
Ray,
My
Lai
Massacre,
BRITANNICA
(2017),
https://www.britannica.com/event/My-Lai-Massacre.
266. Id.
267. Id. But not all Army personnel participated in the massacre. Warrant Officer Hugh
Thompson was instrumental in saving many innocent lives. Id.
268. See James E. Baker, Good Governance Paper No. 21: Obedience to Orders, Lawful Orders, and
the
Military’s
Constitutional
Compact,
JUST
SEC.
(Nov.
2,
2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/73221/good-governance-paper-no-21-obedience-to-orders-lawful-ordersand-the-militarys-constitutional-compact (“Obedience to orders is the vital principle of military life—the
fundamental rule, in peace and in war, for all inferiors through all the grades from the general of the
army to the newest recruit.” (quoting WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS (2d ed.
1920))).
269. John Ford, When Can a Soldier Disobey an Order?, WAR ON THE ROCKS (July 24, 2017),
https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/when-can-a-soldier-disobey-an-order/ (“Soldiers taking
orders in combat must act quickly and don’t always have time to calmly deliberate on
every decision.”).
270. Id.
271. See, e.g., UMSC Fiscal Year 2021 Schedule for Senior Leader Legal Course, Legal
Officer Course, and Legal Clerk Course, MARADMIN 456/20 (Aug. 12, 2020, 7:00 PM),
https://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/MessagesDisplay/Article/2310797/usmc-fiscal-year-2021-schedule-for-senior-leader-legal-courselegal-officer-cou (announcing a course to “provide[] familiarization with the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, administrative fact-finding bodies, administrative separation procedures,
the courts-martial process, and ethics”).
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Thus, a President’s unlawful order to the acting Secretary of
Defense, Secretary of the Army, or DCNG commander should
never lead to these subordinate officers taking unconstitutional or
unlawful action. Had one of these officers called President Trump
on January 6 and asked for permission to deploy the DCNG to
protect the Capitol, and the President refused, then these officers’
training and oaths would demand that they disobey.272 Or, should
Trump have told the DCNG to stand down as the riot continued,
the DCNG commander would be bound by his oath to refuse.
Because the President provides subordinate military leaders
with significant delegated power and those leaders swear an oath
to the Constitution, there should never be danger of the military
committing unlawful acts. Thus, these pillars—constitutional
support for the President as the Guard’s commander in chief and
political backlash from naming a D.C. executive commander—
foreclose any serious discussion of the mayor or governor as
commander in chief of the DCNG.
CONCLUSION
One event, even as tragic as January 6, should not lead to
changes in command of the DCNG. The nation must avoid another
insurrection if it wants to stand firm against her enemies.273 Yet
transferring control to the mayor would shift the balance of power,
offend the Constitution, and lead to undesired consequences. The
Constitution, Congress, and the President concur that the Chief
Executive, not Congress or the D.C. Mayor, commands the
DCNG.274 Another President may make a wrong decision when it
comes to D.C. security. But there are strong safeguards to prevent

272. See, e.g., Amanda Macias, Top Military Leaders Condemn “Sedition and Insurrection”
at Capitol, Acknowledge Biden Win, CNBC (Jan. 12, 2021, 6:56 PM), https://cnb.cx/3sBVkDq
(“‘As we have done throughout our history, the U.S. military will obey lawful orders from
civilian leadership, support civilian authorities to protect lives and property, ensure public
safety in accordance with the law, and remain fully committed to protecting and defending
the Constitution[.]’”) (quoting Gen. Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).
273. President Biden asked in an address on Apr. 28, “[c]an our democracy overcome
the lies, anger, hate, and fears that have pulled us apart? America’s adversaries . . . are
betting we can’t. . . . They look at the images of the mob that assaulted the Capitol as proof
that the sun is setting on American democracy.” Biden, supra note 1.
274. Echoing Judge Agnew, the Constitution demands nothing less. AGNEW, supra note
131, at 16 (“Thus, it is the purpose of the Constitution, and his duty to put down insurrection.
To this end, the whole military force is at his command.”).
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another January 6. For these reasons, the President should remain
the DCNG commander in chief.

756

